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The Latest Home Education Challenge: The Relationship
Between Home Schools and Public Schools'
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.2
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)
I. INTRODUCTION
In America today, as many as one million school-aged children
are being educated at home.3 The number of children enrolled in
home schools in North Carolina reached 11,222 during the 1994-95
school year;4 this number represented an eighty percent increase over
the previous year.5 The expansion of home education in North Caro-
lina is consistent with the increasing popularity of home education
throughout the country.6 The growth in the home school population
1. This Comment uses "home schooling," "home education," and "home instruction"
interchangeably. Additionally, this Comment focuses upon North Carolina law in its
footnotes to demonstrate the influence of state law upon the relationship between home
and public education.
2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
3. CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, THE RIGHT To HOME SCHOOL: A GUIDE TO THE LAW
ON PARENTS' RIGHTS IN EDUCATION xiv (1995); see also David S. Adams, Home Schooling
in Kansas: Friend or Foe, 63 J. KAN. B. ASS'N. 30, 30 (1994) (observing that "the estimates
range from 300,000 to as many as one million children being schooled at home"). It has
been predicted that "by the turn of the century approximately 2% of the school-aged pop-
ulation in the United States" could be taught at home. MARALEE MAYBERRY ET AL.,
HOME SCHOOLING: PARENTS AS EDUCATORS Xiii (1995).
These estimates quantifying the number of students educated in home schools are
complicated by a high turnover rate. Alfie Kohn, Home Schooling, THE ATLANTIC, Apr.
1988, at 21, reprinted in MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 61
(3d ed. 1992). For example, Kohn notes that "[a] private survey conducted in Washington
state found that two thirds of all home-schooled children had been in that situation for two
years or less, while a Florida survey found that only 30 percent of the students learning at
home had done so during the previous year." Id.
4. ROD HELDER, DIVISION OF NON-PUBLIC EDUCATION, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
1995 NORTH CAROLINA HOME SCHOOL STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2 (1995).
5. Id at 4.
6. See MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 7 (tracking the growth of home-based
instruction from the 1980s, when 60,000 to 125,000 children were in home schools, to 1994,
when 450,000 to 800,000 children were educated at home); see also Adams, supra note 3, at
30 (estimating that the number of children home schooled in the past decade has increased
tenfold). Not only has the number of children attending home schools increased nation-
wide, but the number of home schools has grown by approximately 15% per year. MAY-
BERRY ET. AL., supra note 3, at 7.
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is unlikely to dwindle in the near future.7 In fact, in a December 1993
front-page article, USA Today recognized home schooling as one of
the major "trends" of the 1990s, the effects of which will be felt into
the twenty-first century.8
In addition to growing popular support for home schooling, the
recent political atmosphere also lends support to home schooling.
The contemporary tendency to support politically conservative parties
(including the "religious right"), demonstrated during the 1994 con-
gressional elections, which brought Republican majorities to both the
national9 and state10 legislatures, suggests that lawmakers will listen
closely to lobbyists for the home-schooling movement." One study
found that "more than three quarters of the home-educating parents
are affiliated with the Republican party,"' 2 and a striking majority of
them are highly religious individuals.13 Conservative politicians, par-
ticularly politicians with ties to the "religious right," are likely to con-
tinue to urge legislative support for home schooling in order to
7. See MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 9-10.
8. Anita Manning, Life In '94 Will Offer Glimpse into Next Century, USA TODAY,
Dec. 22, 1993, at 01D.
9. Helen Dewar, Quick Action Planned for Ambitious Hill Agenda, WASH. POST, Jan.
3, 1995, at A4; Bob Minzesheimer & Judi Hassen, Pomp, Circumstance, then Down to
Work, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 1995, at 03A.
10. Joseph Neff & Joe Dew, Legislators Draw Battle Lines, NEws & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh, N.C.), Jan. 26, 1995, at 1A (recognizing that although Democrats hold a slim majority
in the state senate, Republicans have taken overwhelming control of the state house of
representatives).
11. In fact, home educators were politically effective even before the Republican ma-
jority took over the legislatures. In 1994, home-schooling supporters "overwhelmed the
capitol's phone system for days" voicing their opposition to a teacher certification provi-
sion in a bill reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Phil Kuntz,
Home-Schooling Movement Gives House a Lesson, 52 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 479, 479
(1994). In the end, the objectionable provision was defeated in the House of Representa-
tives by a vote of 424 to 1, and an amendment specifically protecting home education was
approved by a vote of 374 to 53. Id. at 480.
12. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 39 (reporting the results of a study conducted
upon home-schooling parents in Washington, Utah, and Nevada). In addition to the fact
that most home educators are Republican, the "majority of home school parents label their
political views as 'conservative' or 'extremely conservative' (77%)." Id. Conversely, "only
7% [of the home school parents surveyed] indicate any tie to the Democratic party," and
very few home educators consider themselves to be either politically "moderate" (7%) or
politically "liberal" (6%). Id. at 39-40. On the other hand, 64% of the general population
"label themselves either politically moderate or liberal." Id. at 40.
13. Id. at 34. One study found that 78% of the home school educators from Washing-
ton, Utah, and Nevada attended church at least once a week, whereas less than one-third
of the national population attends church that often. Id. at 35. Approximately 85 to 90%
of the parents who choose to educate their children at home do so for religious reasons.
KLICKA, supra note 3, at 3. For example over 74% of the home schools in North Carolina
are classified specifically as "religious schools." HELDER, supra note 4, at 3.
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maintain favor for the Republican party with the growing number of
voters in the home school movement.'
4
With an increasing number of individuals participating in home
education and with continuing political support for "conservative"
political actors, home-schooling issues are unlikely to disappear in the
near future. Instead, as home schools become responsible for the edu-
cation of increasing numbers of the nation's children, new questions
will arise regarding the relationship between home schools and public
schools and the responsibilities of each toward the nation's youth. On
many issues, the desires of home-schooling parents will likely conflict
with those of public school administrators. Eighty-one percent of
home educators feel that they need or want to enroll their children in
extracurricular events at public schools,' 5 and seventy-six percent of
home educators would also like to enroll their children "part-time" in
academic courses in public or private schools.' 6 On the other hand,
public school administrators are unlikely to desire responsibility for
the heightened administrative burdens of a school system in which
children may come and go throughout the day.'
7
14. See Edward Knox Proctor V, Note, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home
Education, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1302, 1326 (1986) (stating that although "most educators 'de-
sire legislation to prohibit home instruction altogether as a substitute for public school
attendance,' . . . the 'far right' could 'make such legislation difficult to pass' " (quoting
Peek, Home Instruction and the Compulsory Attendance Act, SCHOOL MANAGEMENT AD-
VISOR, Series 3, at 3 (1986) (available from the North Carolina Dep't of Pub. Instruction,
Educ. Bldg., Raleigh, N.C., 27603-1712))).
15. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 73. In addition, according to one study, 64%
of home educators want use of public school libraries and materials; 33% of home educa-
tors want help and resources from a school district certified teacher; and 60% of home
educators want guidance on effective teaching methods. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Proctor, supra note 14, at 1326 ("The North Carolina Department of Public
Instruction is already arguing for the enactment of serious restraints on parents who edu-
cate their children at home.... [M]ost educators desire 'legislation to prohibit home in-
struction altogether as a substitute for public school attendance.' " (quoting Peek, supra
note 14, at 3)). This reluctance to permit home schools and public schools to integrate is
reflected in both the North Carolina Constitution and the North Carolina General Stat-
utes. Article IX of the North Carolina Constitution establishes two types of education as
mutually exclusive education options: public school and education "by other means."
N.C. CONsr. art. IX, § 3. In Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1985), the
North Carolina Supreme Court supported the dichotomy between public and home
schools by establishing that home schools satisfy the state's compulsory attendance laws
and relieving the public schools of their obligation to educate home-schooled students
under § 115C-378 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Id. at 402-03, 329 S.E.2d at 648.
In addition, under § 115C-565 of the North Carolina General Statutes, home schools are
not subject to any of the statutes governing public schools or private schools; instead, they
remain legally independent from those institutions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-565 (1994).
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Consider a typical home education situation. A young husband
and wife,18 neither of whom have a college education, 19 choose to edu-
cate their children at home for religious reasons.20 As the children
advance in their studies, they reach a point at which they are both
eager and ready to engage in an advanced and sophisticated course,
such as chemistry. Neither parent feels competent to instruct the chil-
dren on that subject, or the home school does not have the laboratory
equipment necessary to provide thorough training in chemistry.2
Should the public schools have an obligation to accept those children
for one class (chemistry) per day, while permitting them to continue
receiving the rest of their education at home? Should the parents be
required to discontinue teaching their children at home when their
children surpass their learning base in one aspect of the children's
studies? Should there be an interplay between home schools and pub-
lic schools? Who should determine when public schools have a re-
sponsibility to accept home-schooled children into their classrooms?
22
This Comment addresses the relationship between home schools
and public schools and the conffict over the possible integration of
home and public school educations. More specifically, this Comment
will (1) examine the history of home schooling in America and the
antagonistic relationship between home and public educations;23 (2)
identify the legal rights and interests involved when home-schooling
18. See MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 30 (stating that a majority (60%) of par-
ents who home educate their children are in their thirties).
19. See KLICrA, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that "at least 50% of the parents [who teach
in home schools] have only a high school diploma"); MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at
30-31 (stating that only one-third of the parents included in the survey conducted by the
authors "graduated from college with an undergraduate degree").
20. See KLICKA, supra note 3, at 2; MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 34-36.
21. The number of hypothetical situations in which home-schooling parents might de-
sire that their children attend partial days in public schools or in which public schools
might desire to "take" a child from a home school environment into the public school seem
infinite. Unlike the hypothetical discussed in the text of this Comment, not all situations in
which home-schooling parents might seek partial integration with public schools are moti-
vated by educational objectives. If permitted to send a child to public school for a select
number of classes, a home-schooling parent may choose to send their child to public school
for a few classes merely to give the parent a break from their children, or to permit the
parent to complete grocery shopping for the week, or for any of a number of other reasons.
22. This series of questions is not meant to be exhaustive of the issues that arise out of
the hypothetical situation described in the text. Additional issues regarding the implica-
tions of integration of home and public schooling on the rights and interests of parents,
children, and the state are addressed below. See infra notes 288-381 and accompanying
text. In addition, administrative issues that would arise if it were determined that public
schools must accept home-schooled students for one or two classes per day are discussed in
section V. See infra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
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issues arise;24 (3) discuss the approach courts have taken when con-
fronted with a challenge requiring the resolution of conflicting rights
and interests in the home school context;' (4) examine one of the
recent home-schooling challenges, the relationship between home
schools and public schools, and apply the "rights and interests" analy-
sis to this new issue;2 6 and (5) propose a solution to the conflict that
arises over the possible integration between home and public
educations.27
II. HISTORY OF HOME SCHOOLING IN AMERICA
Parent-directed education has deep roots in American history. In
fact, our nation began without public schools or compulsory attend-
ance laws.28 When laws regarding education existed in America's
early history, they focused upon the responsibility of parents and
"masters" to teach children, but did not provide for schools or teach-
ers.29 Because of this early reliance on home education, many of
America's early leaders and intellectuals, including George Washing-
ton3° and Mark Twain,3 were schooled at home.32
24. See infra notes 48-259 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 260-87 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 288-358 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 359-81 and accompanying text.
28. JOHN W. WHITEHEAD & WENDELL R. BIRD, HOME EDUCATION AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIBERTIES 23 (1986). There was an exception to this general statement-a few
local common schools existed in New England in 1776. Id.
29. Gerald B. Lotzer, Comment, Texas Homeschooling: An Unresolved Conflict Be-
tween Parents and Educators, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 469, 470 (1987). Parents and masters
were to provide education, including reading and religious instruction, for the children. Id.
(citing GEORGE R. CRESSMAN & HAROLD W. BENDA, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN AMERICA
21-23 (1956)). Similarly, English Poor Laws of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
were designed to make children "productive citizens by teaching them a trade or profes-
sion under the guidance of a master." Id (citing CRESSMAN & BENDA, supra, at 21-23).
30. JOHN C. FITZPATRICK, GEORGE WASHINGTON HIMSELF 19 (1933). In fact, nine
presidents were educated "wholly or substantially through home education." WHITEHEAD
& BIRD, supra note 28, at 24. Other home-educated presidents include James Madison,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, John Quincy Adams, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson. Id
at 24-25.
31. DELANCEY FERGUSON, MARK TWAIN: MAN AND LEGEND 21, 24, 29 (1943).
Many other intellectuals and leaders were home schooled, including Phillis Wheatley,
G. HERBERT RENFRO, LIFE AND WORKS OF PHILLIS WHEATLEY 11, 12 (1969), General
George Patton, HARRY H. SEMMES, PORTRAIT OF PATrON 14-15 (Paperback ed. 1964);
Agatha Christie, AGATHA CHRISTIE, AN AUTOBIOGRA'HY 13, 14 (1977); Pearl Buck,
PAUL A. DOYLE, PEARL S. BUCK 24 (1965), George Bernard Shaw, HESKETH PEARSON,
GEORGE BERNARD SHAw: A FULL LENGTH PORTRAIT 11 (1942), and Andrew Carnegie,
BURTON J. HENDRICK, 1 THE LIFE OF ANDREW CARNEGIE 21 (1932).
32. WHITEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 24-25.
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During this era of home-schooling dominance, "[h]ome education
was successful."33 In 1765, John Adams commented that" 'a native in
America, especially of New England, who cannot read and write is as
rare a Phenomenon as a Comet.' ",34 This observation was supported
by the Dupont study in 1800 which also concluded that early America
enjoyed universal literacy.
35
Despite the success of home schooling, laws governing education
began to change after the American Revolution. Massachusetts initi-
ated a wave of state legislation governing public education. Shortly
after the revolution, it enacted a law requiring towns to support and
operate schools outside the home.36 In 1852, Massachusetts passed
America's first compulsory attendance statute.37 The new law "re-
quired that children between the ages of eight and fourteen attend
school for twelve weeks a year."38 As other states began to view
schools as an important means to socialize children and to assure that
children acquired basic skills, they also began to expand public educa-
33. hd at 24. Studies conducted on home-schooled children today suggest that home
schooling works in our contemporary environment as well as it did before the American
Revolution. In 1990, a national study of over 2,163 home-educating families found that the
average scores of home school students "were at or above the 80th percentile in all catego-
ries," including reading, language, math, science, and social studies. KLICKA, supra note 3,
at 10 (citing BRIAN RAY, NATIONAL HOME EDUCATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A NATION.
WIDE STUDY OF HOME EDUCATION: FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, LEGAL MATTERS, AND
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 53-54 (1990)). In addition, when home school students are com-
pared to public school students, the home school students generally outperform their pub-
lic school counterparts on standardized tests. Id. at 8, 12. In North Carolina, the Division
of Non-Public Education compiled test results of a number of home school students in
grades K-12 on the California Achievement Test and found that they scored, on average,
"at the 73rd percentile on the total battery of tests: 80th percentile in reading, 72nd per-
centile in language, and the 71st percentile in math." Id. at 13. In South Carolina, home
school students scored 30 percentage points higher than their public school counterparts on
a Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills. Id. at 8. Similarly, the State Department of Educa-
tion in Alaska found that home-schooled children scored on average 16 percentage points
higher on standardized tests than children of the same grades in conventional schools. Id.
at 12. Many state departments of education have found similar results. In Tennessee, Ore-
gon, Arkansas, Arizona, and Nebraska, state departments of education have recognized
that home school students outperform their public school counterparts on standardized
tests. Id. at 12-14.
34. WHITEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 24 (quoting 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY OF JOHN ADAMS 257 (LH. Butterfield ed., 1961)).
35. Id. Although the subject pool of this study is not clearly identified, this author
suggests that this statement regarding universal literacy only applies to a particular class of
individuals in nineteenth century America.
36. Lotzer, supra note 29, at 470 (citing LAvRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM F. AIKMAN,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 24 (1980)).
37. Id. (citing KOTIN & AIKMAN, supra note 36, at 25).
38. Id.; see KOTIN & AIKMAN, supra note 36, at 25 (citing 1852 Mass. Acts 170, ch.
240, §§ 1, 2, 4).
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tion and require attendance in schools. 39 By 1918, every state in the
nation had a compulsory school attendance law.4" These laws placed
the burden of assuring attendance on the parents and imposed penal-
ties on parents whose children did not comply with the statute.4
With the universal adoption of compulsory attendance statutes
throughout the nation, home educators began to lose their "right" to
educate children in the home. Essentially, the compulsory attendance
laws "eroded the common law parental right to educate one's own
children."42 Under these statutes, parents were criminally sanctioned
if they kept their children at home and did not send them to school.43
39. Lotzer, supra note 29, at 471 (citing FRANK R. KEMERER, THE EDUCATOR'S
GUIDE TO TEXAS SCHOOL LAW 1 (1986)).
40. Id. (citing KEMERER, supra note 39, at 1). After 1918,
compulsory school attendance laws changed very little until 1954, when the
landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education required racial integration of
the public schools. In order to circumvent integration, several states began to
repeal their compulsory attendance statutes, but by 1983 every state had re-en-
acted its compulsory attendance law.
Id. (citing KOTIN & AIKMAN, supra note 36, at 34).
41. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 1993) (providing that parents "shall" be
responsible for their children's compliance with the compulsory attendance statutes of the
state); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1(b) (1992) (providing that parents whose children vio-
late the compulsory education statute of the state "shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to a fine ... or imprisonment... or both"); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 167.031.1 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (providing that if a child does not attend
school in compliance with the compulsory attendance statute, that child's parents shall be
"in violation of the provisions of section 167.061"); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3212 (McKinney
1995) (providing that parents "shall" be responsible for their children's compliance with
the compulsory attendance statutes of the state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1994) (stat-
ing that a parent "may be in violation of the Compulsory Attendance Law and may be
prosecuted if the [student's] absences cannot be justified under the established attendance
policies of the State and local boards of education"); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254 (Michie
1993) (providing that parents "shall" be responsible for their children's compliance with
the compulsory attendance statutes of the state).
42. Donald D. Dorman, Note, Michigan's Teacher Certification Requirement as Ap-
plied to Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 733, 735 (1990).
43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-13(c) (1995) (imposing fines or hard labor for the
county upon parents whose children violate compulsory attendance laws); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-690.1(b) (1992) (imposing fines or imprisonment upon parents whose children vio-
late compulsory attendance laws); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.990(3) (Baldwin 1992) (im-
posing criminal sanctions upon parents whose children violate compulsory attendance
laws); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1994) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-20 (Law. Co-
op. 1990) (same).
It is important to recognize the distinction between compulsory education and com-
pulsory attendance:
In common usage, it has become customary to employ the terms "compulsory
attendance" and "compulsory education" interchangeably. This practice does not
reflect the reality of the law. The term "compulsory education" rarely appears in
the education laws of states. It is merely "attendance"-at some facility or pro-
gram which purports to be educational-which is generally required, and not "ed-
ucation"...... [Only] California really uses [the term "compulsory education" in its
1996) 1919
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Naturally, as states' responsibility for education expanded, ideas
about parental roles in education changed. Inevitably, parents' obli-
gations to provide education for their children were relegated to "sec-
ondary" status."
The shift in educational responsibility from parents to the states
created an antagonistic relationship between parents who wished to
continue to home school their children and public school administra-
tions that sought to enforce their authority to educate via compulsory
attendance laws. This conflict in interests led to a number of lawsuits
beginning in the 1920s and continuing through recent times.4 5 In
these cases, courts clarified the rights and interests involved in the
home-schooling debate.46 Interestingly, the rights and interests in ed-
ucational control claimed by parents, children, and the states today
closely resemble the interests claimed by those parties decades ago. 7
III. LEGAL INTERESTS IN EDUCATION: INTERESTS AT ODDS IN
HOME-SCHOOLING DEBATES
Although the United States Constitution contains no language
that expressly deals with the education of children, and the United
States Supreme Court has never ruled on home schooling per se,
Supreme Court decisions on related constitutional issues, lower court
decisions in home-schooling cases, and definitions of educational in-
terests by state constitutions and state courts have delineated the
rights and interests relevant to the home-schooling debate. The perti-
nent rights and interests are divided into three groups: (1) parents'
rights;48 (2) states' interests;49 and (3) children's rights.50 The nature
and extent of the rights or interests claimed by each group are dis-
cussed below.
education statutes] in a way that appears to require something called "education"
to occur after the more easily compelled process called "attendance" has
occurred.
KOTIN & AIKMAN, supra note 36, at 71.
44. Dorman, supra note 42, at 735. In fact, now, if parents wish to forgo public educa-
tion to educate their children at home, they may face an uphill battle. Id.
45. See infra notes 48-249 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 48-104 and accompanying text.
47. Compare Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing that
parents have a right to direct their children's educations and that states have interests in
reasonably regulating education) with Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 513, 515 (M.D.
Pa. 1987) (mem.) (recognizing that parents have a "substantial constitutional right" to di-
rect their children's educations and acknowledging the states' interests in education as
well).
48. See infra notes 51-187 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 188-237 and accompanying text.




Advocates of the home-schooling movement have identified four
primary sources of authority in the United States Constitution from
which parents derive the right to home school their children: (1) the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause;51 (2) the First Amend-
ment;52 (3) the implied constitutional right to privacy and an express
right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment;5 3 and (4) the Ninth
Amendment. 4 Each of these areas of constitutional protection for
home educators will be discussed in turn below.
The Fourteenth Amendment55
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
applied in three different manners to assist parent educators in consti-
tutionalizing their "right" to home school their children. First, the
Due Process Clause has been interpreted to protect a parent's power
to "control the education of their own children. '56 Second, the Due
Process Clause prohibits laws or regulations that are impermissibly
vague57 and has important implications for compulsory attendance
51. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No state shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. The First Amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV; see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (holding that
individuals possess a privacy right with which laws may not interfere under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and making it unconstitutional to prohibit the mere private pos-
session of obscene material).
54. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
55. See supra note 51.
56. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that a statute prohibiting
schools from teaching any language other than English was unconstitutional in part be-
cause the means adopted by the statute conflicted with "the power of parents to control the
education of their own children"); see infra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
57. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("It is a basic principle of
due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly de-
fined."); see infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
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statutes which have been used to prevent home schooling. Finally,
the Due Process Clause prohibits laws or regulations that involve im-
permissible administrative discretion and may provide a due process
claim to home educators if they must seek permission from a public
school official before they begin home schooling.
59
During the 1920s, three significant Supreme Court decisions rec-
ognized a parental liberty to select the means and manner of their
children's education in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." In the first of these cases, Meyer v. Nebraska, the
Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska statute that imposed criminal
penalties on public or private schoolteachers who taught any language
other than English, or who taught in any language except English, to
children who had not completed the eighth grade.61 The legislation at
issue in Meyer was born of the animosity against foreigners aroused by
World War 1.62 In Nebraska, the target of the anti-foreign-language
legislation was the German language. 63 The state claimed that such'
Although the Supreme Court noted that the "desire of the legislature
to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals" was under-
standable,6 5 the Court rejected the state's claim and upheld the par-
ents' right to engage a teacher to teach their son to read German.66
58. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
59. See WHITEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 57-58; infra notes 113-20 and accompa-
nying text.
60. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284,298 (1927) (noting that the "parent has the
right to direct the education of his own child without unreasonable restrictions"); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that an act that "unreasonably in-
terfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control" was unconstitutional); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (holding that
a statute that interfered with the "power of parents to control the education of their own"
was unconstitutional). Long before the 1920s, Sir William Blackstone stated that parents
had total authority over their children's education under common law. 1 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *450-53.
61. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
62. David M. Smolin, Comment, State Regulation of Private Education: Ohio Law in
the Shadow of the United States Supreme Court Decisions, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1003, 1004-05
(1986). Animosity against alien groups also inspired the legislation at issue in Farrington.
273 U.S. at 298 (noting that the act in question was part of a "deliberate plan" against
foreign language schools with "no adequate reason"); see infra note 82.
63. See generally MORRIS JANOwrrz, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PATRIOTISM: EDUCA-
TION FOR CIviC CONSCIOUSNESS (1983) (discussing generally the anti-foreign nature of
education legislation and recognizing specifically that the legislation in Meyer was anti-
German).
64. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-03.
65. l at 402.
66. Id. at 403. Although the Meyer Court ruled for the parents, it did recognize that
the state possessed some power to regulate education. Id. at 402 ("The power of the State
to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools,
including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned.")
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The Court essentially determined that the instructor's right to en-
gage in the profession of teaching and the parents' right to encourage
and control the education of their children were fundamental rights
contained in the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.67 The Court concluded that the legislation
in Meyer interfered with both of those rights.68 Since the rights at
issue were fundamental liberties protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the state's interests were subject to strict scrutiny.69 In
the end, the state's interests had to yield to the individual's right in
order to prevent a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 70
Only two years after the Supreme Court recognized that parents
possess a constitutional right to control the education of their children
with regard to foreign language training, a new challenge to that right
confronted the Court. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,71 two private
schools, one a religious school and one a non-religious military
school,72 challenged Oregon's Compulsory Education Act.7 3 This
statute required "every parent, guardian, or other person having con-
trol or charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years to
send [that child] to a public school ... and [notified every parent that]
failure to so do [was] declared a misdemeanor."'74 Attempting to de-
fend the statute, "Oregon's argument to the Supreme Court in Pierce
was a mixture of concern with social integration and blunt xenopho-
bia."' 75 The Court applied the doctrine of Meyer76 and held the statute
But, in this particular case, the Court determined that the Nebraska statute was arbitrary
and without a reasonable relation to a legitimate state end. Id. at 403; see infra notes 188-
237 and accompanying text (discussing states' abilities to regulate education).
67. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-401.
68. Id at 401.
69. See infra notes 260-76 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test used
by the courts to determine whether the home educators' rights or the states' interests must
yield when they conflict with one another).
70. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
71. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
72. Id. at 531-33. The fact that one of the challengers in Pierce was a non-religious
institution is significant, because a majority of the cases establishing a parental right to
direct the education of their children are also protecting a parental right to control the
religious upbringing of their children. See, e.g., Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 386, 329
S.E.2d 636, 638 (1985) (holding that parents satisfy the state compulsory attendance statute
by educating their children at home in their religious "Hallelujah school"). The holding in
Pierce, however, is not inherently tied to religion and may be applied to individuals who
choose to home school without a religious motive. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532-33 (recognizing
that one appellee in the case was a military academy without the benefit of First Amend-
ment protection of religion).
73. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
74. Id.
75. Smolin, supra note 62, at 1008. The state "argued that its voters might have passed
the statute as a response to religious suspicion generated by the separation of children
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unconstitutional because it plainly "interfere[d] with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control."77 The Court reasoned that a liberty pro-
tected by the Constitution under the Due Process Clause, such as the
right of parents to control the education of their children, may not be
abridged by legislation "which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State."78 The Court explained
that a state could not claim as a legitimate purpose the mission to
"standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only."' 79 Such a purpose could not supersede the con-
stitutional right of parents to direct the education of their children.
Not long after the Pierce Court affirmed Meyer °8 and further es-
tablished that the Constitution protected the right to choose an educa-
tional alternative outside the public schools, 81 the Supreme Court
decided the third significant education case of the 1920s, Farrington v.
Tokushige. Farrington expanded the principles of Meyer and Pierce
by holding that once parents choose to educate their children outside
the public schools, the state may not diminish the effect of that choice
by establishing regulations that affirmatively direct the "intimate and
which accompanies sectarian schooling. The mingling of children of different sects might
lessen religious suspicion and thereby contribute to the unity of the community." Id. (cit-
ing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 525). Essentially, Oregon argued that the statute was reasonable
because it would Americanize immigrants. Id. (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 526).
76. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 410 (1923)).
77. Id. at 534-35. The Court not only identified a parental right to direct the education
of children under the parents' control, but also imposed a duty on parents to accept respon-
sibility for that task. Id. at 535. The Court stated that "[ihe child is not the mere creature
of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. The Court also
recognized that private schools as businesses have a right to protection against "arbitrary,
unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction
of their business and property." Id- at 535-36.
78. l at 535.
79. Id. The Pierce Court did, however, recognize that the state could reasonably regu-
late education in some contexts. Id at 534; see infra notes 188-237 and accompanying text
(discussing states' abilities to regulate education).
80. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (affirming Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
81. Id. at 535.
82. 273 U.S. 284 (1927). Farrington involved a challenge to Hawaii's Foreign Lan-
guage Act which required foreign language teachers to get a permit from the Department
of Public Instruction and prove that they were pro-democracy and knowledgeable about
America before they could teach. Id. at 290-98. Like the statute in Meyer, this statute was
prompted by animosity against an alien group, but unlike the statute in Meyer, the statute
in Farrington was directed against the Japanese. Id. at 298. The Court noted that "[tihere
[were] one hundred and sixty-three foreign language schools in the Territory. Nine [were]
conducted in the Korean language, seven in the Chinese and the remainder in Japanese."
Id. at 290-91. Therefore, the legislation had a disproportionate impact on the Japanese.
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essential details" of the alternative school's operations.8 3 More specif-
ically, the Court determined that the state may not retain "affirmative
direction" over details of privately supported schools that would
"deny both owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretion in
respect of teachers, curriculum and text-books." 8 The Court stated
that the state may not "deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure
for their children instruction which they think important and we can-
not say is harmful" by effectively eliminating selection of teachers and
curricula in privately supported schools." Like Meyer and Pierce,
Farrington relied upon the "general doctrine touching rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment to owners, parents and children
in respect of attendance upon schools.
'86
As one observer has noted, "[v]iewed broadly, Meyer, Pierce [and
Farrington] create a private realm of decision-making into which
states cannot easily intrude, [and a] parent's right to shape his child's
education falls within that realm."87 Under this broad interpretation,
these three cases from the 1920s may be understood to protect a par-
ent's decision to teach her child at home. However, none of the hold-
ings applied directly to home education; therefore, they do not assure
a constitutional right to such education. In sum, although these cases
do not expressly create a right to home education, they do lay the
foundation for later decisions. 88
In 1972, the Supreme Court accepted the opportunity to apply
the 1920s trilogy to what was arguably a home-schooling context. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder,89 the state charged, tried, and convicted two
Amish parents for violating "Wisconsin's compulsory school-attend-
ance law [which] required [parents] to cause their children to attend




87. Alma C. Henderson, The Home Schooling Movement: Parents Take Control of
Educating Their Children, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 985, 992.
88. See Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298-99 (holding unconstitutional a statute that applied
to privately supported schools, not home schools); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535-36 (1925) (holding unconstitutional a statute as applied to a private religious school
and a private military school, not as applied to a home school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a statute that applied only to private
schools, religious schools and public schools, not home schools); see also James C. Easterly,
Comment, "Parent v. State": The Challenge to Compulsory School Attendance Laws, 11
HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 83, 88 (1990) (arguing that even though these cases are
frequently cited in cases regarding parents' rights to educate their own children, none of
them directly address the issue of parents educating their children at home).
89. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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public or private school until reaching age 16. ' '90 The respondents de-
clined to send their children, ages fourteen and fifteen, to public
school, and they did not enroll their children in any private school
recognized under the compulsory attendance law.91 Instead, respon-
dents chose to act "in accordance with the tenets of the Old Order
Amish communities '92 and provide vocational home-instruction in the
Amish community during the "crucial and formative adolescent pe-
riod of life." 93 The respondents conceded that they were subject to
the Wisconsin statute, 94 but they challenged the constitutionality of
the statute as it applied to them.95
The Yoder Court held Wisconsin's compulsory attendance statute
unconstitutional as applied to the Amish families because (1) it
abridged the free exercise of religion of the Amish parents and chil-
dren;96 and (2) it violated the Amish parents' liberty to direct the edu-
cation of their children. 97 The Court expressly held that
this case involve[d] the fundamental interest of parents, as
contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future
and education of their children. The history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental con-
cern for the nurtur[ing] and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition. If not the first, perhaps the most endur-
ing statements of the court in this area are found in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.98
Thus, the Yoder Court affirmed the holding of Pierce and applied the
due process fundamental liberty analysis in the home school context.99
90. Id. at 207.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 209.
93. Id. at 211; see also WHrrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 30 (classifying the par-
ents' educational choice in Yoder as "home instruction").
94. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
95. Id. at 208-09.
96. Id. at 207, 219, 234; see infra notes 124-58 and accompanying text (offering a more
detailed analysis of the applicability of the First Amendment to home-schooling debates).
97. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
98. ld.. at 232. The Court also explained that there was "no doubt" as to the power of
the State to impose reasonable regulations upon educational choices, but determined that
in this case, the regulations were not sufficiently important to outweigh the interest in
protecting the fundamental constitutional liberties at stake. Id. at 234; see infra notes 188-
237 and accompanying text (discussing state interests sufficient to overcome a constitu-
tional challenge to statutes infringing on fundamental liberties such as the right of parents
to direct the education of their children).
99. Yoder emphasized that the parental liberty to direct the education of their children
is not just an ordinary constitutional right, but is recognized as a "fundamental" constitu-
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"Without question, the Pierce decision is 'generally accepted as
currently effective' constitutional precedent,"'100 and a number of re-
cent federal and state cases have affirmed the 1920s cases and Yoder
in a home-schooling context. 10' The parental right to direct the edu-
tional right. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14. This distinction is significant because once a right is
classified as fundamental, any regulation of the right is subject to heightened or strict scru-
tiny. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing that when a home educator demonstrates that a state regulation burdens her
fundamental rights, the government must then establish that a compelling governmental
interest warrants that burden), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Cammermeyer v. Aspin,
850 F. Supp. 910, 914 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (stating that "[s]trict scrutiny is [] required when
laws impinge upon constitutionally protected 'fundamental' rights" (citing City of
Cleburne .v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985))); WITrmEAD & BIRD, supra
note 28, at 32.
At least one author has argued that Yoder, like Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington, may
address the issue of the rights of parents to educate their own children, but "neither its
facts nor its conclusions go to the heart of the home schooling problem." Easterly, supra
note 88, at 88. Easterly believes that the inapplicability of the 1920s cases and Yoder to
home schooling is particularly apparent when "the parents' claimed right is secularly,
rather than religiously, rooted." Id. Other authors and cases cite the 1920s decisions and
Yoder as definitive affirmations of the constitutional right of parents to educate their chil-
dren at home. See, e.g.,-Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 933 (6th
Cir. 1991) (affirming the "right of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their
children, as recognized in [ ]Yoder ... and Pierce[ ]" in a home education context); WHrrE-
HEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 28-32.
100. WHrrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 31 (quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 600 (1970)); see also Herndon v. Chapel Hill-
Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 1443, 1450 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (recognizing that the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of parents to direct the
upbringing and education of their children and stating that "[t]he importance of [that] right
... is well established"); KLICKA, supra note 3, at 39 (stating that "it is clear [that] the
constitutional right of a parent to direct the upbringing and education of his child is firmly
entrenched in the U.S. Supreme Court case history").
101. See, e.g., Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 513,515 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (mem.) (stat-
ing that "[p]arents have a substantial constitutional right to direct and control the upbring-
ing and development of their minor children"); Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre Sch.
Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (holding that parents have a "constitu-
tional right to educate [their] children in an educationally proper home environment"),
affd, 798 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 598, 600 (Mass. 1987)
(stating that home education is a "right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" and that
the object of compulsory attendance laws is" 'that all children shall be educated, not that
they shall be educated in any particular way' " (quoting Commonwealth v. Roberts, 34
N.E. 402, 403 (Mass. 1893))); Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 400, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646
(1986) (recognizing that "if [the court] interpreted [North Carolina's] present school at-
tendance statutes to preclude home instruction, serious constitutional questions would
arise").
In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed the principles of Pierce and Yoder outside the
home school context as recently as 1990. Employment Div. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881 (1990). In Smith, two American Indians who ingested peyote as part of their
religious beliefs were fired from a private drug rehabilitation organization. Id. at 874.
When they sought unemployment compensation, they were denied because they had been
discharged for "misconduct." Id. Although the holding in this case relied upon the fact
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cation of children remains a fundamental right protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 2 In fact, as re-
cently as 1990, in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,10 3 the
Supreme Court affirmed the principles of Yoder and Pierce, stating
that "the right of parents... to direct the education of their children"
continues to enjoy protection as a fundamental right under the
Constitution.0
In addition to protecting individuals' fundamental rights from be-
ing abrogated by state regulations, the Due Process Clause prohibits
impermissibly vague laws or regulations.0 5 Therefore, Due Process
protects home educators against vague statutes, and the state may not
constitutionally penalize them for violating a statute that is impermis-
sibly unclear.'06 This has important implications for compulsory at-
tendance statutes which are often used to attack home-schooling
families:
In home schooling matters... [i]n states with vague compul-
sory attendance laws, a family is in compliance with the
compulsory attendance law only if what they are doing is sat-
isfactory to the local superintendent. If they are doing some-
thing which the local superintendent deems unsatisfactory,
then they are in violation of the law. Violation of these com-
pulsory attendance statutes is a criminal offense. As a result,
in these states with vague laws, a home schooler is guilty of a
that the First Amendment did not protect drug use, the Court went out of its way to em-
phasize that the "compelling interest test" is still applicable to the "Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as ... the right of parents, acknowl-
edged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their
children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)." Id. at 881 (emphasis added). But
see Null v. Board of Educ., 815 F. Supp. 937, 939.40 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (mem.) (finding
that parents do not possess a fundamental right to direct their children's education, but
rather only a general liberty interest subject to reasonable regulation); Hinrichs v.
Whitburn, 772 F. Supp. 423, 432 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (finding no cases recognizing existence
of fundamental right in parents to direct their children's education and concluding that the
right at issue was merely a liberty interest subject to reasonable state regulation), aff'd, 975
F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1992).
102. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 39. But see State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 378 (N.M.
App.) (rejecting an argument that the New Mexico court should apply a "strict scrutiny"
standard to determine whether the exclusion of home education from the state's attend-
ance statute violated the Equal Protection Clause), cert denied, 464 U.S. 940 (1983).
103. 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
104. Id. at 881.
105. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (stating that "[iut is a basic
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined").
106. See State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750,755-56 (Wis. 1983) (holding Wisconsin's com-




crime for the sole reason that they have failed to satisfy a
particular public school official who may create whatever
standards he chooses .... Therefore, home schoolers could
and are criminally charged for violating standards that exist
only in the mind of a local superintendent.
10 7
When this situation arises, courts recognize that the compulsory at-
tendance law in question is unconstitutionally vague if (1) the law
does not provide enough guidance to permit a person of "ordinary
intelligence" to know what is prohibited, thus resulting in a "trap" for
the innocent without fair warning;108 and (2) the law permits arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement because no explicit standards are
available for those who apply the law.' 0 9
Recently, advocates of home schooling have successfully chal-
lenged the compulsory attendance laws of six states on vagueness
grounds." 0 Essentially, courts recognize that "when interpretation of
the law is left up to local school districts, variances, and thus unconsti-
tutional vagueness, is the result.""' Therefore, the Fourteenth
Amendment's constitutional protection against the enforcement of
vague statutes continues to provide significant protection for home-
schooling families, especially those who live in states without home
107. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 86-87.
108. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308,318 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (stat-
ing that the term "equivalent instruction" in Iowa's compulsory attendance statute "fails to
give adequate notice to the ordinary man of what is prohibited by the statute"), ajfd in
part, rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987) (reversed only as to the district court's
decision concerning attorney's fees); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (providing the
original statement of the reasons for which a court may find a statute unconstitutionally
vague).
109. Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516,518 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (mem.) (holding Penn-
sylvania's compulsory attendance statute unconstitutionally vague); Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F.
Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding compulsory attendance law of Missouri unconsti-
tutionally vague because "th[e] statute represents a prime example of legislation which
yields an unacceptable amount of discretion to officials charged with its enforcement"),
rev'd, 802 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1986) (reversing without opinion).
110. See Jeffery, 702 F. Supp. at 518 (holding Pennsylvania's compulsory attendance
statute unconstitutionally vague); Ellis, 612 F. Supp. at 381 (holding Missouri's compulsory
attendance statute unconstitutionally vague); Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 159 (Ga.
1983) (holding Georgia's compulsory attendance law "unconstitutionally vague"); Iowa v.
Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Iowa 1987) (recognizing that unclear language in the com-
pulsory attendance law precluded conviction of home-educating parents); People v. Pebler,
No. 91-0848-SM (Mich. 3-B Dist. Ct., St. Joseph County, July 2, 1991) (order dismissing a
case against a home-schooling mother who had been arrested, finger printed, had mug
shots taken and charged with criminal truancy after oral arguments because the Michigan
compulsory attendance law was "vague and unclear as to what specifically constitutes a
violation of that act"); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 1985) (holding
Minnesota's compulsory attendance law unconstitutionally vague).
111. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 92.
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school laws and who continue to be subject to criminal sanctions
under compulsory attendance statutes.
112
In addition to protecting against intrusion into the exercise of
fundamental liberties and against the enforcement of vague laws, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that deci-
sions affecting fundamental rights be made by a "neutral and detached
judge in the first instance.""' Of course, "[e]very state has a compul-
sory attendance law and in every state the local public school officials
have the exclusive authority to enforce this law. Many states give the
superintendents discretion, in some way, over whether or not a home
school will be able to operate. 11 4 However, school officials and su-
perintendents are not neutral decision-makers for two reasons. First,
many school superintendents believe that public schools are far supe-
rior to home schools in nearly every category of educational con-
cern.1 5 Second, they have a "financial incentive to disapprove a
home school" because if a child is not home schooled, the probability
that the child will attend public school increases."16 Public school offi-
cials want as many children as possible to attend their schools because
each local school district receives $2000 to $4000 per student in state
and federal tax dollars." 7 Since the public school officials who deter-
mine in the "first instance" whether a home school may operate are
not neutral, home schools should be able to successfully challenge a
denial of permission to operate by challenging the impartiality of the
decision-maker.
Several courts have recognized the constitutional guarantee of a
neutral decision-maker for decisions bearing upon fundamental rights
in the home-schooling context." 8 However, no cases or literature in-
dicate that a person or group seeking to establish a home school has
112. 1d at 94-95.
113. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972) (emphasis added).
114. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 109.
115. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 94. Contrary to the understandings of many
school superintendents, most research suggests that home school students outperform their
public school counterparts on standardized academic tests. Id.; see supra note 33.
116. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 111. The Supreme Court has held that a decision-maker
with a partisan bias (or a financial incentive that is not personal to the decision-maker) is
inconsistent with the Due Process Clause. Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62.
117. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 111. In Florida, the director of finance for one school
system was alarmed that the district had lost $398,000 in 1987 for the students who were
receiving home education. Id. According to the Supreme Court, a decision-maker with a
financial incentive is not a "neutral magistrate" and therefore is disqualified under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
118. See, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308, 318 (S.D. Iowa
1985) (recognizing that "local school boards have an inherent conflict of interest since each
student in a private school is potentially a source of additional state aid," but resting its
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ever successfully reversed a truancy conviction on the grounds that the
individual who denied the home school permission to operate was not
neutral.119 The due process guarantee of an impartial decision-maker
for rulings that affect a fundamental liberty, such as a parent's right to
control the education of her children, should be available to assist
home-schooling parents who are denied an opportunity to operate
their home schools by a biased public school official. In reality, how-
ever, this form of constitutional challenge has not been a widely used
or even mildly successful protection for home-schooling parents.
120
To summarize, home-schooling parents enjoy three types of pro-
tections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Due process protects the parents' fundamental liberty to direct
the education of their children;' 2' it shields parents from punishment
under unconstitutionally vague compulsory attendance statutes;
22
and the Due Process Clause protects parents from losing their "right"





In addition to rights enjoyed under the Fourteenth Amendment,
home-schooling parents often exercise rights that are protected under
the First Amendment."z Two aspects of the First Amendment, the
holding on a different principle), affd in part, rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987)
(reversed only as to the district court's decision concerning attorney's fees).
119. Only two cases in the home-schooling context have ruled on the issue of whether
allowing a superintendent to be a decision-maker in this context (with both a financial
interest in the decision and a partisan bias) violates due process. The due process claim
failed in both cases. In State v. Toman, 436 N.W.2d 10 (N.D. 1989), a due process chal-
lenge arguing that a biased school official should not have power to deny the parents an
opportunity to home educate their children was not made in a timely fashion and the court
did not consider it fully. Id at 11. In State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 965 (1988), the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the home-
schooling parents that the Due Process Clause "entitles a litigant to an impartial, neutral,
and disinterested tribunal," but the court disagreed that the school board decision-maker
had an opportunity to exercise bias under the laws of that state, so the parents' claim
failed. Id. at 320.
120. See, e.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding
that a public school superintendent's role in assessing parents' home instruction programs
to determine whether home-schooling programs were substantially equivalent to the qual-
ity of education offered in public schools did not violate parents' procedural due process
right to an impartial decision-maker), appeal dismissed, 866 F.2d 548 (2nd Cir. 1989).
121. See supra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
124. For the pertinent text of the amendment see supra note 52.
125. KLmCKA, supra note 3, at 49.
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Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause, protect parents
who choose home education for their children.
A majority of parents who teach their children at home choose
home education for religious purposes, 6 electing the option "because
they hold a religious belief that education must be Bible-centered.'
2 7
Consequently, if the state attempts to prevent these parents from edu-
cating their children at home, the state prevents the parents from ex-
ercising their religious beliefs.' 28 This means that a home school
family who is prosecuted for failing to comply with a local restriction
governing home education "can use the First Amendment as a de-
fense as long as they prove the particular restriction violates their reli-
gious belief."' 29
The leading decision on the free exercise of religion in the con-
text of home education is Wisconsin v. Yoder.'30 In that case, the state
argued that it had a compelling interest in education which should
override the regulation's burden on religious freedom.' 3' The Court
disagreed and declared:
The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by
exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of
attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by sub-
stantially interfering with the religious development of the
Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the
Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of de-
velopment, contravenes the basic religious tenets and prac-
tice of the Amish faith, both to the parent and the child.'
32
126. Id.; MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 35; see supra note 13 (providing a statisti-
cal analysis of the religious character of home educators).
127. WHrrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 37. Many parents who home educate their
children believe that "parents are given the responsibility by the Bible of carefully in-
structing their children." Id. at 38. Several Bible verses are consistently cited as the bibli-
cal foundation directing that all teaching be by parents and from a Christian standpoint:
(1) "And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart: And thou
shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in
thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou
risest up." Deuteronomy 6:6, 7; (2) "Train up a child in the way he should go .. " Prov-
erbs 22:6; (3) "And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath: but bring them up in
the nurture and admonition of the Lord." Ephesians 6:4; (4) "For I know him, that he will
command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the
Lord to do justice and judgment." Genesis 18:19.
128. See KLIcKA, supra note 3, at 49.
129. Id.
130. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts of Yoder).
131. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217.
132. Id at 217-18.
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Consequently, the Court held that despite the state's strong interest in
"universal education," the fundamental rights of Amish parents to di-
rect the educational and religious upbringing of their children must be
recognized and respected.'33 In Yoder, the parents' First Amendment
right to freely exercise their religion prevailed, and the compulsory
attendance statute that threatened the Amish families whose children
did not attend public schools was held unconstitutional as applied to
them.1
34
Recently, the Michigan Supreme Court used the First Amend-
ment to protect home schools in Michigan v. DeJonge.135 In that case,
the state criminally prosecuted and convicted home educators for
teaching their children at home without teacher certification as re-
quired by law.' 36 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion, but the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, stating that
the DeJonges believe that the word of God commands them
to educate their children without state certification. Any
regulation interfering with that commandment is state regu-
lation of religion. The certification requirement imposes
upon the DeJonges a loathsome dilemma: they must either
violate the law of God to abide by the law of man, or commit
a crime under the law of man to remain faithful to God. The
requirement presents an "irreconcilable conflict between the
mandates of law and religious duty."'1 37
The court further stated that "[t]o entertain the notion that either
this Court or the State has the insight to interpret the DeJonges' reli-
gion more correctly than they is simply 'an arrogant pretension.' "138
Therefore, the court decided that "the teacher certification require-
ment is an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment as applied to families whose religious convic-
tions prohibit the use of certified instructors. Such families, therefore,
133. Id. at 214. The Yoder Court stated:
A State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally
free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and inter-
ests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children.
Id.
134. Id. at 236.
135. 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993).
136. Id. at 129-30.
137. Id. at 137 (quoting Michigan Dep't of Social Servs. v. Emmanuel Baptist Bible
Church, 455 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1990) (Cavanagh, J., concurring)).
138. Id. at 139 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (Appendix)).
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are exempt from the dictates of the teacher certification
requirements." 39
Although this First Amendment right provides some protection
for parents who home educate for sincere religious purposes, 140 not all
First Amendment defenses for home-schooling families are success-
ful.141 The courts often reject claims that the First Amendment pro-
tects a choice to educate children at home.142 In response to this
reality, Christopher Klicka argues that the courts' reasoning contains
a "major constitutional flaw" in nearly every case in which home edu-
cators have not succeeded in invoking the First Amendment to protect
their decisions to become home educators. 43 He contends that the
First Amendment should protect home educators from state regula-
tion in every case in which home educators choose home schooling for
139. It at 144.
140. A few recent cases have affirmed the Yoder decision and recognized that the First
Amendment protects home education. One commentator observed that a Michigan dis-
trict court sustained the religious exercise right to home education when it stated that
" 'this court won't and no Court should interfere with the free exercise of a religious belief
on the facts of this case.' " WHrrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 46 (quoting State v.
Nobel, No. 5791-0114-A, slip op. at 12 (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegan County, Jan. 9, 1980)). In
North Carolina, in a case in which home educators challenged the constitutionality of the
state's compulsory attendance statute on First Amendment grounds (as a defense to a
charge under that statute), the trial court stated that because the home educators were
sincere in their religious motivation for home schooling their children, the home school
received First Amendment protections. See Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 388, 329
S.E.2d 636, 640 (1985).
141. Often, the First Amendment issue in home-schooling cases arises after parent edu-
cators are charged with a violation of either a state compulsory attendance statute or a
local regulation governing home schools and, in response to the charges, raise a defense
under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387-88, 329 S.E.2d at 639
(recognizing that home educators were charged under the state compulsory attendance
statute and that home educators defended that charge using the First Amendment).
142. See, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 678 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D. Iowa
1988) (upholding "equivalent instruction" requirements which burdened religious beliefs),
on remand from 815 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1986) (remanding in part d6 to promulgation of
new standards for "equivalent instruction"), appealed from 620 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Iowa
1985) (finding "equivalent instruction" requirements unconstitutionally vague); Nebraska
v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579-80 (Neb.) (upholding a teacher certification
requirement against a Christian school and parents who had demonstrated that the certifi-
cation burdened their religious beliefs), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 803 (1981); State v. Patzer,
382 N.W.2d 631, 639 (N.D.) (upholding teacher certification requirements against the es-
tablished religious beliefs of home educators), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986); North Da-
kota v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 900 (N.D. 1980) (upholding teacher certification
requirements in the face of a First Amendment challenge); Ohio v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d
627, 629-30 (Ohio) (upholding requirement that home educators seek approval of local
superintendent for home education program in face of First Amendment challenge by
home educators), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 942 (1987); see also infra notes 219-23 and accom-
panying text (discussing states' interests in regulating education).
143. KLiCKA, supra note 3, at 71.
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religious reasons."1 ' Further, he maintains that in each case in which
the courts have denied First Amendment protection to home educa-
tors, these courts have made errors in their interpretations or applica-
tions of the constitutional principles governing First Amendment
claims.'45 Regardless of how one interprets these cases, the First
Amendment does not thoroughly protect home educators who choose
home education for sincere religious reasons. State interests in regu-
lating education have overcome First Amendment concerns in a
number of contexts. 46
Since not all home educators choose home schooling for religious
purposes, and since the Free Exercise Clause has not proven to be a
consistent source of protection for home educators, some home-
schooling families also have turned to a second aspect of the First
Amendment, the Free Speech Clause, for protection against excessive
regulations and even prohibitions of home education.147 The First
Amendment protection of speech includes protection of beliefs and
thoughts, 48 and in many cases, parents home school their children to
integrate their family's beliefs and values with their children's educa-
tion.149 As one commentator has stated:
While in the past parents frequently based their decision on
religious considerations, this increasingly is no longer the
case. In support of the parental right to educate children at
home is the argument that conscientious and informed par-
ents are the most aware of the children's needs and are best
qualified to integrate learning materials with their family's
own philosophy and values."'
144. Md.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church, 678 F. Supp. at 214 (upholding "equivalent
instructions" requirements which burdened religious beliefs); Faith Baptist Church, 301
N.W.2d at 579-80 (upholding a teacher certification requirement against a Christian school
and parents who had demonstrated that the certification burdened their religious beliefs);
Patzer, 382 N.W.2d at 639 (upholding teacher certification requirements against the estab-
lished religious beliefs of home educators); Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 900 (upholding teacher
certification requirements against a First Amendment challenge); Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d at
629-30 (upholding requirement that home educators seek approval of local superintendent
for home education program in face of First Amendment challenge by home educators);
see also infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (discussing states' interests in regulating
education).
147. WHrrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 51.
148. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
149. WHrrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 51-52.
150. E. Alice Law Beshoner, Home Education in America: Parental Rights Reasserted,
49 UMKC L. REv. 191, 193 (1981).
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Recognizing that parents may choose to home educate because
they wish to impart familial beliefs to their children as opposed to
subjecting their children to the "powerful impact of [public] education
on students' ideologies and values,' 151 at least one court has con-
cluded that a nonreligious First Amendment freedom of speech and
belief is sufficient to uphold home education in the face of a chal-
lenge.'Y2 In that case, In re Falk, parents chose home education be-
cause they held a philosophical opposition to the group learning
experience common in modem public schools.' 53 Absent a religious
motivation to home educate, the court upheld the home school's
legitimacy. 54
Despite this success, no state supreme court (nor the United
States Supreme Court) has decided a case based on the protection
claimed by home educators under the Free Speech Clause. However,
the legal foundation for protection certainly exists, and more families
may choose to rely on this nonreligious First Amendment protection
in the future. 55
In summary, under the First Amendment, home educators who
elect home schooling for religious purposes may find constitutional
protection for their right to educate their children at home under the
Free Exercise Clause.' 56 However, courts have not consistently up-
held this right in the face of state regulation. 157 Similarly, individuals
who elect to home school for philosophical or nonreligious reasons
may find constitutional protection under the Free Speech Clause, but
the right to home school for philosophical or nonreligious reasons has
not been "tested" in any high courts and may not provide consistent
protection. 158 Although home educators may have a "right" to home
school under the First Amendment, that right has not been viewed
consistently in the various courts hearing cases on that issue.
151. WHIrrFHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 52.
152. See In re Falk, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786-87, 791 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981) (mem.).
153. Id. at 786-87.
154. Id. at 791.
155. If courts begin to uphold rights to home school on freedom of speech and belief
grounds, then nonreligious parents as well as religious parents will be able to choose from
the full range of educational alternatives for their children. If they do not uphold the right
to home school on nonreligious grounds, but they do continue to uphold home schools on
religious grounds, then parents who form "religious home schools" will enjoy greater rights
than nonreligious parents who wish to home school.
156. See supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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The Right to Privacy 159
In addition to the support home-schooling families find under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, home educators, because they ed-
ucate in their homes, may claim a right to privacy in their home
schools that is unparalleled in public institutions. In Stanley v. Geor-
gia,160 the United States Supreme Court recognized an individual right
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's pri-
vacy, particularly privacy in the home. 6 ' According to some authors,
this constitutional right to privacy in the home extends to decisions to
educate children at home.162 These authors rely on Perchemlides v.
Frizzle, a Massachusetts Superior Court decision, to support that the-
ory.163 In Perchemlides, the court stated:
There will remain little privacy in the "right to privacy" if the
state is permitted to inquire into the motives behind parents'
decisions regarding the education of their children. As plain-
tiffs here point out, the plaintiffs in [the landmark case re-
garding the right of parents to direct their children's
education'"] included a secular military academy, and the
holding in that case did not mention religious beliefs or the
Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment.
65
Following the logic enumerated in Perchemlides, home educators
could argue that all home schools deserve equal protection under the
implied constitutional right to privacy regardless of the religious or
secular nature of the home school. However, the Perchemlides deci-
159. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
160. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
161. 1k at 567-68 (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
criminalizing mere private possession of obscene materials in a home). While no "right of
privacy" has been found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, a right of privacy is
an "implied right" created under the penumbra of rights enumerated in the Constitution.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (reasoning that "the specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees"
that imply that individuals enjoy a "zone of privacy" protected by "several fundamental
constitutional guarantees"). This "implied right" is significant because protection for non-
religious home schools under the First Amendment has not been fully tested in the courts,
and the First Amendment may not protect nonreligious home schools to the same extent
that it protects religious home schools. The implied right of privacy, however, does not
depend upon whether the home school has a religious component, and therefore, it should
provide protection equally to all types of home schools.
162. See, e.g., WHITEHEAD & BirD, supra note 28, at 54.
163. Id. (citing Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641, slip op. at 9, 27 (Mass. Super. Ct.,
Hampshire County, Nov. 13, 1978)).
164. This landmark case is Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 530 (1925); see supra
notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing Pierce in greater detail).
165. Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641, slip op. at 9, 27 (Mass. Super. Ct., Hampshire
County, Nov. 13, 1978)).
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sion has no precedential effect for courts outside Massachusetts,166
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
come to a contrary conclusion in Murphy v. Arkansas.67 In Murphy,
parents challenged the constitutionality of the Arkansas Home School
Act on a number of grounds, including a claim that the Act violated
their right to privacy.' 68 The Murphys argued that "the right of pri-
vacy should be extended to protect parental decisions concerning the
direction of a child's education from state interference."' 169 In re-
jecting that argument, the court of appeals quoted the Supreme Court
and stated:
"A person's decision whether to bear a child and a parent's
decision concerning the manner in which his child is to be
educated may fairly be characterized as exercises of familial
rights and responsibilities. But it does not follow that be-
cause the government is largely or even entirely precluded
from regulating the child-bearing decision, it is similarly re-
stricted by the Constitution from regulating the implementa-
tion of parental decisions concerning a child's education.'
170
Ultimately, the Murphy court clearly "decline[d] to extend the right of
privacy to this situation.'
171
Considering Perchemlides and Murphy together, one must recog-
nize that the implied right to privacy is not a certain protection for
home educators. Although an implied right to privacy may protect
parents from disclosing their motivations for home educating their
children and entitle all home schools (regardless of religious affilia-
tion) to equal constitutional protection, 172 the proposition is certainly
debatable.
166. In fact, because Perchemlides is only a superior court decision, it does not have
much precedential effect within Massachusetts either.
167. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988).
168. Id at 1041; see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-15-501 to -507 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995)
(Arkansas Home School Act).
169. Murphy, 852 F.2d at 1044.
170. Id (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976)).
171. Id
172. Various courts have denied claims by home educators made specifically under the
Equal Protection Clause, and therefore, the Equal Protection Clause has not been a direct
source of protection for home educators. See, e.g., id (upholding the Arkansas Home
School Act in the face of an Equal Protection Clause challenge by parents home schooling
their children); Null v. Board of Educ., 815 F. Supp. 937, 940 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (mem.)
(holding that a statute that makes children ineligible for home schooling if their standard-
ized test scores fall below the fortieth percentile and do not improve does not violate the
equal protection rights of home-educating parents or their children); Hinrichs v. Whitburn,
772 F. Supp. 423,434 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that a decision not to treat home schooling
as work activity for purposes of an exemption from mandatory participation in an AFDC
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More recently, supporters of the home education movement have
begun to argue that a different sort of privacy right protects home
schools from government intrusion. This alternative "right to privacy"
theory is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's protection of an indi-
vidual's right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures.' 73
This Fourth Amendment right to privacy applies in the home-school-
ing context when compulsory attendance statutes or specific home
school statutes allow state officials to visit home schools to enforce the
state's statutory regulations on home education.174 As one commen-
tator has suggested:
It is a fundamental principle of due process that if a govern-
ment official comes into one's home for the purpose of mak-
ing a determination whether or not a criminal law is being
complied with, then such an intrusion into the home is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Since
violation of the compulsory attendance law is a crime, a
home visit by a public school official to determine compli-
ance with the law is a violation of the home schooler's Fourth
Amendment rights. 7 '
Concurring with this principle, the Rhode Island Commissioner of Ed-
ucation stated that the "Fourth Amendment and also the constitution-
ally derived right to privacy and autonomy which the United States
Supreme Court has recognized protect individuals from unwanted and
warrantless visits to the home by agents of the State.' 76
In Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 77 however, a New York court held
that although home educators have a right to privacy in their homes
protected by the Fourth Amendment, the on-site home visits required
under New York law for the purpose of approving a particular home-
schooling program do not violate that right. 78 The court recognized
that "an individual's home 'traditionally has been regarded as the
center of [that] person's private life, the bastion in which one has a
legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.' ",179 However, the court also explained that "because [the state
work program did not deny the home educator equal protection), affd, 975 F.2d 1329 (7th
Cir. 1992).
173. See supra note 53.
174. See KcKA, supra note 3, at 122 (citing Kindstedt v. East Greenwich Sch. Comm.,
Op. Rhode Island Comm'r of Educ., at 5 n.12 (Aug. 7, 1986)).
175. Id. at 123.
176. Kindstedt, at 5 n.12.
177. 689 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed, 866 F.2d 548 (2nd Cir. 1989).
178. Id. at 138, 142.
179. Il at 138 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 883 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
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does] not attempt on-site visits without the permission of the families
involved, and because it cannot be fairly said that some right or privi-
lege is conditioned upon consent to such visits, the court finds that
[the state is] entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' fourth
amendment claims."' 180
Considering both the opinion of the Commissioner of Education
in Rhode Island and the decision of the New York district court in
Blackwelder, the right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment, like
the implied right to privacy under the Constitution, provides only un-
certain support for home educators. However, the few courts that
have considered the issue have recognized that a Fourth Amendment




The final constitutional provision to which home educators turn
to shield their choice to home school their children from attack by
state regulations is the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment
states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."'83 Supporters of the home-schooling movement contend
that a trend exists in the courts to "recognize more and more rights
within the protection of the Ninth Amendment."'184 Home-schooling
advocates further argue that a parent's right to home educate her
child should be the newest right identified under the Ninth Amend-
ment.8 5 Despite these arguments by supporters of the home educa-
tion movement, the Ninth Amendment has not become a significant
factor in home education debates. In fact, parents have rarely in-
180. ML at 142.
181. Id. at 138.
182. See supra note 54.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
184. WHITEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 55 (arguing that "courts have upheld pa-
rental rights over the care, custody, and nurture of their children; the right to privacy; the
right to travel and abide in any state; and parents' liberty toward their children" under the
Ninth Amendment and that more rights are likely to be identified under that amendment
(citations omitted)). The belief that new rights, including a right to educate a child at
home, will be recognized under the Ninth Amendment is not universally held. See, e.g.,
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 900 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that
"although the Court has continued to enforce 'fundamental' interest analysis in the areas
of procreation, voting, access to the courts, and travel, it has essentially frozen the list of
'fundamental' interests").
185. See WHITEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 55 (citing Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No.
16641, slip op. at 27 (Mass. Super. Ct., Hampshire County, Nov. 13, 1978), as having recog-
nized the Ninth Amendment's significance in the home school context).
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voked it in their efforts to establish the constitutional protection of
their decisions to home educate their children.
186
In conclusion, home educators claim constitutional protection of
their choice to home school their children under four areas of the
Constitution: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause;
(2) the First Amendment; (3) an "implied right" to privacy and a
Fourth Amendment right to privacy; and (4) the Ninth Amendment.
Although various courts have recognized constitutional protection
under each of these four provisions of the Constitution, home educa-
tors have not always succeeded when invoking these protections.
Even when the Constitution clearly protects the parents' choice to ed-
ucate their children at home, "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a
State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to im-
pose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education."' 87
State's Interests
Although parents who educate their children at home may claim
extensive protection for that choice under the Constitution, the states
maintain competing interests in the education of the children within
their boundaries. 88 States rely on three primary sources of authority
when they claim an interest in regulating the education of children
within their borders: (1) the Tenth Amendment; 189 (2) the police
power of the states;190 and (3) the parens patriae power of the
states.' 9 ' This section addresses in turn each of these justifications for
and origins of state regulations governing education.
The Tenth Amendment provides that any powers not delegated
to the federal government, nor prohibited to the states, under the
Constitution are reserved in the states or people.'" Since the United
States Constitution does not mention education, authority over educa-
186. Authors advocating the home education movement rely upon Perchemlides, slip
op. at 27, to support their contention that a right to home education should be identified
under the Ninth Amendment; see supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing
Perchemlides in greater detail).
187. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
188. See generally Henderson, supra note 87, at 985-86 (discussing various competing
interests in home-schooling debates); Easterly, supra note 88, at 89-91 (discussing specifi-
cally states' interests in educating children).
189. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X; see infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
190. See Easterly, supra note 88, at 89; infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
191. See Easterly, supra note 88, at 89; infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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tion is reserved to the states or the people under the Tenth Amend-
ment.193 Further, since educational control is not delegated or
prohibited under the Constitution, if education is not a right left to the
people, then the states have power over education. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held
that there is no constitutionally implied right to an education reserved
in "the people."'194 Therefore, the states have reserved power to con-
trol education under the Tenth Amendment.
In Brown v. Board of Education,19 the Supreme Court made two
germane observations. 96 The Court recognized that education is a
legitimate area of interest for state and local government and that
compulsory attendance laws are a reflection of that legitimate inter-
est.197 In doing so, the Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
the state and local governments. Compulsory school attend-
ance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society .... In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
198
It is therefore clear that, although parents may claim constitu-
tional protection for their decisions governing the education of their
children,199 parents have no fundamental right to educate their chil-
dren at home free from governmental regulation.00 This recognition
193. See id.
194. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (stating that
there is no fundamental right to public education). Although individuals do not enjoy a
fundamental right to an education, the Court has recognized other rights that give parents,
"the people," power to make certain educational decisions. See supra notes 51-187 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the struggle for control of childhood education may exist
between parents and the state. See Mark Murphy, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of
Compulsory School Attendance Laws in the Southeast: Do They Unlawfidly Interfere with
Alternatives to Public Education?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 457, 459 (1992).
195. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
196. Id. at 493.
197. Id.
198. ld.
199. See supra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,213 (1972) ("There is no doubt as to the
power of a State... to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) ("No question is raised
concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools."); Clonlara, Inc. v.
Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442, 1455-56 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (recognizing that although parents
may have constitutional protection for at least some aspects of their decision to home
school their child, any "right" to home education is not a right that is free from govern-
mental regulation); People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 106 (Mich. 1993) (holding that
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of authority in the states to regulate education underlies all justifica-
tions for state intervention in education.
20 1
In addition to the states' retention of power over education under
the Tenth Amendment, states assume responsibility for the public wel-
fare through their "police power."202 Under the police power, states
have an obligation to protect the communities within the state. Typi-
cally, when a state bases its statutory action on its police power, courts
allow a presumption that the state has a "legitimate interest in the
area of regulation that the statute addresses. '20 3 However, "if the reg-
ulation adversely . . . abridges a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution (typically a First or Fourteenth Amendment righf [such
as the fundamental rights claimed by home educators]), then the
Court will scrutinize the statute in question and shift the burden of
proof to the state."204 Despite this strict scrutiny, home education is
not free from state regulation, and state regulations implemented
under the state's police power may override the home educator's fun-
damental rights.20 5
In addition to the states' power to regulate education under their
police power, states also enjoy "authority for overriding parents' man-
agement of their children's education [under their] parens patriae
power. ' 20 6 The parens patriae power refers "traditionally to the role
of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disabil-
ity," including juveniles.20 7 In Prince v. Massachusetts,20 the Supreme
Pierce does not "mean that parents have a fundamental right to direct all of their children's
education decisions" (emphasis added)).
201. See Easterly, supra note 88, at 89 (recognizing that the Tenth Amendment permits
states to regulate education in the first instance, but also acknowledging that beyond the
certainty of the enabling power under the Tenth Amendment, "commentators differ on
whether the states find their authority [to regulate] ... through their police power ... [or]
through their parens patriae power").
202. Id.
203. Id. at 90.
204. kl at 90-91.
205. Donald H. Henderson et al., Legal Conflicts Involving Home Instruction of School-
Aged Children, 64 ED. LAW REP. (West) 999, 1003 (1991) (citing In re Kilroy, 467 N.Y.S.2d
318 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983)).
206. Easterly, supra note 88, at 90.
207. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the state asserted parens
patriae power to justify a conviction of Amish parents for withholding their children from
school in violation of the state compulsory attendance law. Id. at 229. The Supreme Court
held that the state failed to sustain its burden of proving that the parents had harmed their
children by forbidding them to attend public school after the eighth grade. Id. at 230.
However, the Court did recognize that in some instances that burden would be satisfied,
permitting the state to regulate.education under its parens patriae power. Id. at 236.
208. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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Court upheld a conviction of a mother who permitted her child to sell
religious magazines on the street and asserted the power of the court
to penalize the mother for failing to send her child to school20 9 In
doing so, the Court affirmed a state's authority to limit parental rights
specifically regarding a child's education and recognized that a state
acting as parens patriae may restrict a parent's right of control by com-
pelling attendance in a school.
210
Since both the parens patriae power and the police power of the
states enable states to regulate education, it can be difficult to deter-
mine which power the state is relying upon for authority to impose
any particular regulation. Any regulation regarding education for
school-age children arguably involves the parens patriae power, be-
cause education regulations govern children, who are legally incompe-
tent. Similarly, any education regulation is arguably imposed to
protect the welfare of the state's communities, because educated citi-
zens are more likely than non-educated individuals to contribute posi-
tively to the community.21' Since it is difficult to distinguish the two
sources of power in this context, commentators suggest that "the au-
thority of the state to oversee the child's education is founded upon
both" the parens patriae power and the police power of the states.212
Although states enjoy a police power and a parens patriae power
through which they may justify regulations of education to protect the
welfare of the state and its vulnerable citizens, any regulation that
abridges a home educator's First or Fourteenth Amendment rights
will be strictly scrutinized by a court if challenged by the home educa-
tor.21 3 In this context, heightened scrutiny of a state education regula-
209. /I at 141.
210. Id. at 166. Similarly, in In re McMillan, 30 N.C. App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693 (1976),
the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a finding that children were neglected be-
cause they did not attend school. Id. at 238, 226 S.E.2d at 695. However, the court noted
that there was no conclusive showing that the children received any alternative education.
It
Some commentators argue that the source of parens patriae in the state is limited by
the Supreme Court's ruling in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), because it is now "generally
held to be improper for the state to invoke parens patriae unless the state produces evi-
dence of parental or guardian neglect that warrants intervention by the state to protect the
child." Easterly, supra note 88, at 90. However, since failure to provide adequate educa-
tion may be deemed to be neglect, this limitation may not be a significant one on the state's
use of the parens patriae power to regulate education for the benefit of the children in the
state. See In re McMillan, 30 N.C. App. at 238, 226 S.E.2d at 695 (holding that failure to
assure that children attend school constituted neglect).
211. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing states' interests in regu-
lating education to protect the welfare of the community).
212. Easterly, supra note 88, at 89.
213. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (recognizing that,
although states have "paramount responsibility" to regulate education in the interests of
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tion does not mean the regulation must yield to the constitutional
right.214 Instead, when a home educator challenges a state education
regulation, the state has the burden of demonstrating either (1) "the
statute does not, in fact, abridge the right as alleged;"2 15 or (2) "even
though the statute does abridge a fundamental right as alleged, the
abridgment is justified by a compelling state interest"21 6 and that this
interest is met by the least burdensome means possible.217
Because states do not often defend the challenges of home educa-
tors on the former ground, challenges to school regulations by home
educators have essentially forced states to articulate the "compelling
state interests" motivating particular education laws. 218 States have
their citizens, such regulations are "not totally free from a balancing process when [they]
impinge[ ] on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with
respect to the religious upbringing of their children"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing that there is "[n]o question" that the state has power "rea-
sonably to regulate all schools," but also holding that the regulations are unconstitutional
where they "unreasonably interfere[ ] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of [their] children" without any "reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401 (1923)
(recognizing that the state does have power to "promote civic development," but holding
the legislation in question unconstitutional after a strict examination of the regulation in
the face of a constitutional challenge); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
1058, 1077 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J., concurring) (recognizing that when a state regulation
burdens a home-schooled student's fundamental rights, "the test for a compelling interest
is quite strict... '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation' " (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (altera-
tion in original))), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp.
1442, 1455-56 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that "certain rights are so essential to guarantee-
ing individual liberty in our society that any government conduct regulating such conduct
will be subject to a strict standard of review").
214. Although strict scrutiny has often been considered to be the "kiss of death" for
government regulations, see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1535
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting), such is not the case with regulations that burden home edu-
cators and their claimed rights. See In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 602 (Mass. 1987) (up-
holding a state regulation against challenge by home educators that it violated their
fundamental rights). In addition, in a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice O'Connor,
writing for a majority of the Court, stated that the Court "wish[ed] to dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' " Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in judgment)).
215. Easterly, supra note 88, at 91 (citing Developments in the Law-The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1167 (1980)).
216. Id.
217. WHrrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 83 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
235-36 (1972)); see also Easterly, supra note 88, at 91 (stating that a state regulation can
survive a constitutional challenge that the regulation abridges a fundamental right if the
regulation is "justified by a compelling state interest").
218. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (recognizing that when Amish parents challenged
the state compulsory attendance statute, the state could have claimed an "interest in its
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articulated three primary interests justifying education regulation.219
States claim that they must regulate education to assure that schools
are effective in (1) preparing citizens to participate effectively and in-
telligently in our political system;220 (2) preparing citizens to be "self-
reliant" and "self-sufficient" members of society;221 and (3) preparing
citizens to be "culturally viable '22 2 and providing them with an "op-
tion other than the life they have led in the past. '223 Each one of
these interests was originally identified in Yoder.224 In that case, the
interests articulated by the state were held insufficient to override the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of parents to control the reli-
gious and educational upbringing of their children.225 However, the
Yoder Court also recognized in dicta that "[t]here is no doubt as to the
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citi-
zens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education. '
226
Recently, several courts have affirmed the importance of the state
interests originally articulated in Yoder in decisions in which the
states' regulations have prevailed over the fundamental rights alleg-
edly abridged by these regulations. For example, in Vandiver v. Har-
din County Board of Education,227 the Sixth Circuit upheld a
Kentucky regulation requiring, that home-schooled students partici-
pate in equivalency testing in the face of First Amendment and Equal
Protection challenges by the home educators. 228
system of compulsory education [ ] so compelling that even the established religious prac-
tices of the Amish must give way"); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that the compelling interests articulated by the state in response to a chal-
lenge by home educators withstood the constitutional challenge); Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1987) (responding to a constitutional
challenge by home educators, the state of Tennessee argued that its interest in the educa-
tion of its young was sufficient to override the home educators' First Amendment rights).
219. Easterly, supra note 88, at 91.
220. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. This interest has been expressly identified in some state
constitutions. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (stating that "[r]eligion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools,
libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged").
221. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
222. Easterly, supra note 88, at 91.
223. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 221; id. at 240 (White, J., concurring); see supra notes 89-99 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Yoder decision).
225. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
226. Id. at 213.
227. 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991).
228. Id at 935.
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In a similar case, In re Charles,229 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld a state regulation that required parents who
wished to home school their children to obtain advance approval for
their decision by submitting a curriculum and an outline of classroom
materials and by proving their qualifications.23 ° The state defended
the regulation against the constitutional challenge by articulating a
"compelling state interest" that all Massachusetts children be properly
educated in an environment which provided an education that was at
least comparable to a public education.23' The court held that the
state regulation was constitutional because it properly promoted the
state's compelling interests despite its burden on the home educators'
constitutional rights.232
Similarly, in State v. Moorhead,33 the Iowa Supreme Court held
that a conviction of home-schooling parents for failing to submit proof
of instruction by a certified teacher in their home school did not vio-
late the Constitution.2 4 There, the state's interest in education sur-
vived a challenge by home educators that the state's regulation
infringed upon their fundamental rights.2 3 5
As these cases demonstrate, the state's compelling interests in ed-
ucation can overcome a challenge by home educators despite rigorous
scrutiny. Home education is not a right free from all state regulation
or control.236 "The bottom line is that a state does have a protected
interest in ensuring that all of its children are educated," and conse-
quently states may regulate education under their police power or
their parens patriae power to satisfy that interest.237
229. 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987).
230. Id. at 602.
231. Id. at 599-600.
232. Id. at 600.
233. 308 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa 1981).
234. Id. at 64-65.
235. Id.
236. Henderson et al., supra note 205, at 1003 (citing In re Kilroy, 467 N.Y.S.2d 318
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983)).
237. J. Bart McMahon, An Examination of the Non-Custodial Parent's Right to Influ-
ence and Direct the Child's Education: What Happens When the Custodial Parent Wants to
Home Educate the Child, 33 U. LOuiSVILLE J. FAM. L. 723, 735 (1994). In some states,
state constitutions provide an additional source of authority upon which state legislatures
may base their education regulations. For example, article I, § 15 of the North Carolina
Constitution provides that "[t]he people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is
the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right." N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 15 (emphasis
added). Additionally, article IX, § 3 of the North Carolina Constitution requires that
"[t]he General Assembly shall provide that every child of appropriate age and of sufficient
mental and physical ability shall attend the public schools, unless educated by other
means." N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 3. Essentially, under the state constitution, the state has
the authority to "guard and maintain" the educational institutions in the state. N.C.
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Children's Rights
While parents and the state compete for the right to direct the
education of children, the "interests and rights of the child are often
overlooked.2138 Typically, courts discuss the rights and interests of the
parties to a lawsuit, and the parties in home-schooling lawsuits are
usually the parents of a home-schooled child and the state. Therefore,
the rights and interests of children are not at issue, and courts do not
have an opportunity to discuss children's stakes in the home-schooling
debate. Additionally, when the United States Supreme Court did ad-
dress children's rights to education, the Court expressly held that a
child does not have a fundamental right to a public school educa-
tion.139 Nevertheless, children do have a property interest in educa-
tion that is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 ' In Goss
CONST. art. I, § 15. Further, the state maintains an obligation to assure that every child in
the state receives an education by some means, and if a child is not receiving an education,
then the state "shall" compel that child to attend the public schools. N.C. CoNsr. art. IX,
§ 3.
238. Lotzer, supra note 29, at 477; see also Murphy, supra note 194, at 459-60 (acknowl-
edging that to date, courts generally have not recognized the interests of the child in their
analyses of educational issues).
239. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
240. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that "the opportunity of an education ... where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms").
In addition to Fourteenth Amendment protection of educational rights, children may
have additional educational entitlements under some state constitutions. Under the North
Carolina Constitution, for example, "[t]he people have a right to the privilege of educa-
tion." N.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 15. Under this state constitutional provision, children are not
granted a right to public education, but they are assured that they have a right to education
in some form. However, when Article I, § 15 is combined with Article IX, § 3, the North
Carolina Constitution provides that if a child is not educated by some means outside the
public schools, that child "shall" attend the public schools. N.C. CONST. art, IX, § 3
("[E]very child of appropriate age and of sufficient mental and physical ability shall attend
the public schools, unless educated by other means."). Essentially, Article IX, § 3 provides
a right to public schools for those children who are not educated elsewhere. In addition to
the state constitutional right to education, some state statutes provide a statutory right to
education as well. North Carolina's public school laws, for example, provide that
[a]ll students under the age of 21 years who are domiciled in a school administra-
tive unit who have not been removed from school for cause or who have not
obtained a high school diploma, are entitled to all the privileges and advantages of
the public schools to which they are assigned by the local boards of education.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-366(a) (1992) (emphasis added). When one combines the general
state constitutional right to education with both the particular constitutional right to public
education when a child is left without a proper education "by other means" and the state
statutory right to public education, it is clear that under North Carolina state law, children
are entitled to public education at least when they are not educated "by other means." In
this regard, North Carolina law has expanded children's rights beyond those articulated
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v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that once a state decides to provide
public education, an important benefit has been conferred which can-
not be taken away from students without due process of law.2 41 Es-
sentiall i, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides a
backdoor into constitutional protection for children in educational (or
legal) debates who have no fundamental right to public school
education.242
In addition to a Fourteenth Amendment property right to public
education, children may also have a right to be "masters of their own
destiny" with regard to educational choices.243 Justice Douglas, in his
dissent in Yoder, argued that although the majority in Yoder assumed
that the only interests at stake in the case were those of the Amish
parents seeking the right to home educate their children and those of
the state seeking to compel the children to attend public schools, the
parents actually were "seeking to vindicate not only their own free
under the United States Constitution. But see infra notes 337-44 (discussing the situations
in which children may not be entitled to public education).
241. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (holding that children cannot be suspended from public
school without a hearing and stating that once a state has "chosen to extend the right to an
education to [students], [the state] may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct,
absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has
occurred").
242. Parents' rights focus upon the right to control in a broad context where children
are educated. By contrast, the rights possessed by children are concentrated in a right to
be educated in a particular place. The rights of parents and children differ because parents
enjoy the right to control the education of their children in a theoretical context; children
simply possess a right of access to the public schools (in some circumstances at least). See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-366(a) (1992) (providing that children are entitled to "the
privileges and advantages of the public schools" only). Unlike the rights of parents and
children, the states' interests in education emphasize a need to regulate education to assure
that children are, in fact, educated, despite the location. See supra notes 218-26 and accom-
panying text. However, the states' interests are based on the inherent assumption that if a
child attends a public school, that child will, in fact, be educated, and therefore states re-
quire attendance in public schools or schools that satisfy the standards of public school
officials. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1992). Unfortunately, the presumption
that children will be "educated" in public schools has not proved to be accurate. See EM-
ILY SACHAR, Srr UP AND LET THE LADY TEACH 246-49 (1991) (discussing some of the
educational failures of public schools). In the end, by preferring public education, the
states' interests may boil down to a rule of preference similar to the parents' and children's
rights in education. These state interests emphasize that an education in a particular loca-
tion, the public schools, should satisfy the state's goals. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
378 (1992) (providing that children "shall" attend the public schools unless certain require-
ments are met by an alternative school and assuming that public schooling will satisfy the
state's interests in children's educations).
243. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("It is
the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to
what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of
their own destiny.").
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exercise claims, but also those of their high-school age children. '2 44
Justice Douglas suggested that the "inevitable effect" of permitting
parents to determine the status of their children as home-schooled
students, while litigating their own rights to exercise religion or to
control their children's upbringing, "is to impose the parents' notions
of religious duty upon their children."2 45 He further argued that
"[w]here the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting
desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an
imposition without canvassing his views."' 2 6 Finally, he contended
that "[o]n this important and vital matter of education ... children
should be entitled to be heard.... It is the future of the student, not
the future of the parents," that is at stake.247
In sum, children clearly possess a Fourteenth Amendment due
process right to public school education under the Goss holding.2 48 In
addition, they may claim a right to be "masters of their own destiny"
under the theory espoused by the dissent in Yoder.249
Although the discrete discussions of "parents' rights," "states' in-
terests," and "children's rights," suggest that each party's rights or in-
terests are clearly identified and easily balanced, that is not the case.
In each home education case there is the potential for many constitu-
tional concerns to arise, and the resolution of those issues is quite
complex. The parents of the home-schooled child may claim one (or
more) of three Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.2 50 The
parents may argue that (1) their fundamental liberty to direct the edu-
cation of their children is at stake;251 (2) the regulation attempting to
infringe upon their home education program is too vague to survive
constitutional muster;25, or (3) a state's decision regarding the par-
ents' right to home school their child was not made by a neutral deci-
sion-maker and is therefore unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause." 3 In addition, parents of a home-schooled child may raise
First,2 4 Fourth, 55 or Ninth Amendment256 claims in any litigation
threatening their "right" to educate their child at home.
244. l at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
245. l at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
246. Il (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
247. Id at 244-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
248. 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
249. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
250. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 124-58 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
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Of course, each time a parent claims that a fundamental liberty
enjoyed under the Constitution should prevent the state from regulat-
ing their home school, the state will respond. The state typically re-
plies to constitutional challenges to its education regulations either (1)
by demonstrating that the fundamental liberty claimed by the parent
is not abridged by the regulation 1 7 or (2) by articulating a "compel-
ling state interest" in regulating education under the state's police or
parens patriae power to justify the regulation despite its burden on
parental liberties.5 8
Finally, in any case involving a child's attendance in a public
school, courts should recognize that the child has a Fourteenth
Amendment right to a hearing before being deprived of public educa-
tion.259 This mix of rights and interests belonging to each of the par-
ties in home education cases must be sorted and balanced by courts
before they can determine that a burden on constitutional rights will
survive or that a state's regulations on education must fail.
IV. A RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS: HOME
SCHOOLING ESTABLISHED AS A LEGALLY RECOGNIZED
ALTERNATIVE TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
The basic freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution apply to par-
ents who elect to home school their children for both religious and
"nonreligious" reasons.26 . When such parents are challenged by state
authorities, usually for a violation of compulsory attendance laws,
courts apply the "compelling interest" test to the state regulations to
determine whether the parents' liberties or the state's interests will
prevail.261 Under this analysis, if the parental liberty of home educa-
tion is challenged by a state agency, the state must demonstrate that it
256. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 216-17 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 51-187 and accompanying text.
261. WHITEHEAD & BiRD, supra note 28, at 83-84; see also Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1202 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (applying a compelling interest test
to a state regulation of education and stating that if a home educator demonstrates a suffi-
cient burden upon her fundamental rights, the government must then establish that a com-
pelling governmental interest warrants the burden, and that less restrictive means to
achieve the government's ends are not available), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). This test is also referred to as "strict scrutiny."
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995) (explaining that the strict
scrutiny analysis is a compelling interest test).
One author has argued that the "undue burden" standard articulated in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,876-78 (1992), should be applied to
confrontations between home educators and state officials, but no courts have applied this
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possesses a compelling interest sufficient to override parental liberty.
"However, even if it does demonstrate such an interest, the state must
also show ... that it has served its interest by the least burdensome
means possible.
'2 62
In the end, most courts find either that the state does not have a
compelling state interest sufficient to override the parents' substantial
liberties or that despite a compelling interest, the state has not se-
lected the least burdensome means to satisfy that interest.2 63 Gener-
ally, courts tend to ignore the children's rights when they compute this
balance." 4 Therefore, the expanding protections established by the
home-schooling movement resulted primarily from courts favoring pa-
rental rights over state interests, with minimal emphasis placed on the
rights of the children involved.265
Since the number of home-schooled students began to rise in the
1980s, state courts and legislatures have had to confront legal ques-
tions regarding home education.266 Legal challenges of state regula-
tions by home educators have whittled away at the numerous barriers
erected by state authorities to threaten the success of home education.
In recent years, home educators have established precedent regarding
not only the "fundamental" nature of the home education decision,2 67
but also regarding particular regulations that attempt to define the
relationship between home and public education. Although a number
of home educators have suffered criminal sanctions because of their
commitment to home schooling, home schooling is now clearly legal in
all fifty states,268 and various courts have determined that a number of
analysis. Jon S. Lerner, Comment, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue
Burden Standard, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 363, 364 (1995).
262. WHrEHEAD & BIRD, supra note 28, at 84; see also Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F.
Supp. 106, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding New York regulation on home schooling the least
restrictive means to serve the state's overriding interest in educating children for participa-
tion in the American political and economic systems), affd, 866 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.
1989).
263. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 17 (stating that "[c]ourt cases generally favor
parents").
264. Lotzer, supra note 29, at 477.
265. Id.
266. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 2, 19.
267. See supra notes 60-100 and accompanying text (explaining the development of par-
ents' fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to control their children's educa-
tion); supra notes 101-04 (describing the application of this fundamental right in a home-
schooling context).
268. KLcKA, supra note 3, at 155. In fact, there are 31 states (and the District of Co-
lumbia) that by statute specifically allow some form of home education provided that cer-
tain requirements are satisfied. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (Supp. 1995); ARK,
CODE ANN. §§ 6-15-501 to -507 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN,
§§ 22-33-104(2)(1) to -104.5 (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN § 31-402 (1993); FLA. STAT.
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regulations that attempt to "control" home schools once they are es-
tablished are unconstitutional.2 69 For example, state regulations re-
quiring home schools or their teachers to be "essentially equivalent"
to public schools are unconstitutionally vague;270 state compulsory at-
tendance regulations that preclude home education have been de-
clared unconstitutional;271 state regulations that permit home
schooling only if the instruction is satisfactory to the district superin-
tendent of schools are unconstitutional;272 and state regulations that
permit "on-site" visits of home schools by state officials may be
unconstitutional.273
ANN. § 232.02(4) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690 (1992); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 298-9(a)(5) (Supp. 1992); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 299.1 & 299A.1 to .10 (West 1988 & Supp.
1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:236 & 236.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A(3)(A)(3) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031
(Vernon Supp. 1996); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102(e) (1995); NEv. REv. STAT. § 392.070
(1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193:1(1)(b) (Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-2
(Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-563 to -565 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-34.1-
06 to -11 (1993 & Supp. 1995); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A)(2) (Anderson Supp.
1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.030(3) (1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327(d) (1992); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 16-19-1 (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-65-40 & -45 (Law. Co-op. 1990
& Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3001(C) (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-
11-102(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (1989); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 22.1-254 to -254.1 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.225.010(1)(b) (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 118.15(1)(a), (d)(5) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-102(B) (1994).
269. See infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
270. See Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that a require-
ment that home education be "substantially equivalent" to the instruction given to children
in public schools was unconstitutionally vague), rev'd, 802 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1986) (revers-
ing without opinion); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 532-33 (Minn. 1985) (holding
that a requirement that home school teachers be "essentially equivalent" to public school
teachers was too vague to serve as a basis for criminal conviction and that the requirement
violated the right to due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment). But see
State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631, 639 (N.D.) (holding that a legislative requirement that
parents who teach their children at home obtain teaching certificates did not violate par-
ents' free exercise rights), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986).
State legislatures are responding to the courts' decisions that teacher qualification
standards impinge upon parental rights to home school. "As of March 1995,forty states do
not require home school parents to have any specific qualifications. In fact, of the ten states
that do have [teacher] qualification requirements, eight of them require only a GED or
high school diploma." KLICKA, supra note 3, at 137. North Carolina is in this category.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (1994) ("The persons providing academic instruction in a
home school shall hold at least a high school diploma or its equivalent.").
271. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
272. Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516, 520-21 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (mem.) (ruling un-
constitutionally vague a statute which required home school teachers' qualifications to
meet satisfaction of school superintendent).
273. Kindstedt v. East Greenwich Sch. Comm., Op. Rhode Island Comm'r of Educ., at
7 (Aug. 7, 1986). But see Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548, 552 (2nd Cir. 1989) (ex-
pressing "no opinion on whether home visits conducted pursuant to New York's regula-
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In response to the success of home educators in the courts, a
trend has traveled "across the nation to lessen state control over pri-
vate forms of education," including home education. 74 Just as the
Supreme Court in Farrington v. Tokushige held that the state could
not regulate the "intimate and essential details," including "teachers,
curriculum and text-books," of private schools,2 75 courts have estab-
lished that states cannot control such details in home schools.2 76 Con-
sequently, home schools are enjoying increased freedom in their
operation. However, this recent trend is unlikely to continue
indefinitely.
Now that home educators have established that home schools are
legitimate, independent of the public schools (and the public school
regulations) in their districts, substantial numbers of home educators
are seeking a new kind of relationship with public schools on their
own terms.2 77 Recall the hypothetical discussed in the introduction of
this Comment, in which young parents with high school degrees home
educate their child for religious purposes.278 As the child advances in
her studies, she may find herself interested in a subject, chemistry, for
example, in which her parents cannot offer her instruction either be-
cause they lack knowledge of the subject or because the home school
is not equipped with the laboratory facilities to properly conduct a
course in chemistry. Now, the home educators seek to return to pub-
lic schools on their terms.
"[A] large percentage of parent educators wish to enroll their
children part-time in extracurricular activities [eighty-one percent]
and academic courses [seventy-six percent] [at the public schools in
their districts], and they also desire to make use of public school fi-
braries and curricular materials [sixty-four percent]. 2 79 Clearly, these
parent educators are more eager "to accept educational resources and
assistance when it is not governed or regulated by government school
district personnel." 0
tions would comport with the requirements of the Constitution[J,]" but stating that "a
challenge to such visits by persons subjected to them would present at least a colorable
legal issue").
274. KLICKA, supra note 3, at 156.
275. 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
276. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
277. MAYBERRY Er AL., supra note 3, at 77 (stating that home schoolers want to use the
resources of public schools "at their own discretion" and "without regulation").
278. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
279. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 71.
280. Id. Although home-schooling parents' perceptions of a "satisfactory relationship
between home schools and conventional schools are characterized by a desire to protect
the autonomy and independence of their home education program," many parents believe
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This new issue, the possible integration of public and home edu-
cation,28' once again pits the rights of home educators against the in-
terests of the state, but it has a different face. Parent educators are
not struggling to keep their children out of public schools as they have
in the past.2 1 Instead, the home-schooling families are seeking per-
mission to send their children to public schools on a "part-time" basis
while retaining their home school status.3 On the other hand, public
school administrators are no longer policing home schools to draw
home-schooled children back into public schools. Instead, state offi-
cials are reluctant to welcome this new relationship between home
and public education because of the administrative burdens of admit-
ting a home-schooled child on a part-time basis.284
This new home-schooling challenge, the possible integration of
home and public education, raises compelling new questions regarding
the relationship between the parents' rights and the states' interests.
Should public schools be obligated to accept home-schooled students
on a part-time basis? Should parent educators be required to relin-
quish educational control over their children if their children surpass
their knowledge base in a particular subject area or if the home school
does not contain the equipment necessary to adequately instruct in a
particular subject? Are the parents' rights to educate their child at
home impermissibly burdened if public schools do not allow parents
to continue to home school their children while permitting their child
that ,this independence is secured when "parents and their children use the resources and
services provided by conventional schools at their own discretion, that is, flexibly and with-
out regulation." Id. at 77.
281. Id. at 103 (stating that today's challenge for educators of all kinds is to begin to
"raise[ ] issues and questions regarding the relationship between home schools and conven-
tional schools").
282. See supra notes 60-104 and accompanying text (discussing the development of par-
ents' right to control the education of their children).
283. Essentially, at this stage in the home education movement, home educators are
shifting gears. The current focus is upon re-entrance, not upon exclusion. This shift in
focus requires that the rights established by parents in the context of exclusion be re-ex-
amined from a new perspective. The rights established in the context of exclusion may not
apply in the context of re-entry. See infra notes 298-381 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 17 (discussing administrative burdens on a school system in which
children may come and go throughout the day); see also Lotzer, supra note 29, at 478-79.
One plan in Texas was rejected by both school officials and home-educating parents:
In 1984, Ross Perot, chairman of the [Texas] Governor's Select Committee on
Public Education, announced a proposal to regulate homeschooling which in-
cluded testing parents and students for competency and placing limitations on
homeschooling for kindergarten thru sixth grade. The plan met with opposition
from both school officials and homeschooling parents: school officials balked at
the administrative burden, and homeschooling parents did not want restrictions
placed on their educational plans.
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to participate in limited portions of public school education? Do the
states' interests in protecting the welfare of their communities and as-
suring the education of children justify preventing a home-schooled
child from attending the public schools on a part-time basis?
Although no court has had an opportunity to address these issues,
this "latest home education challenge" may be the point at which
courts reverse the trend of deciding cases in favor of parents. Addi-
tionally, as courts reconsider the relationship between home and pub-
lic education, children's rights should become a significant concern for
the first time in the home school debate. 85 In this circumstance,
home educators and their children are not attempting to relinquish
the child's right to attend a public school;2 86 instead, they are seeking
to take advantage of that right on their own terms.287 The question of
whether a home-schooled child may attend public schools on a part-
time basis requires an analysis of the extent of the child's right to pub-
lic education. Can public schools prohibit a child from attending
classes in a public school merely because the child receives the major-
ity of her education in a home school?
The final section of this Comment will address the contemporary
challenge to home educators who seek admission for their children in
public schools on a part-time basis. The analysis of this issue requires
a new look at the rights and interests established over the past seven
decades and the application of the "compelling interest" test in a new
context. In addition, children's rights in educational decisions must be
reviewed with renewed vigor in recognition of the increasingly signifi-
cant role of those rights in this new context.
V. THE LATEST HOME EDUCATION CHALLENGE: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOME SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
In recent judicial history, courts have been generous in passing
the reins of educational control from state authorities to parents, per-
mitting parent educators to gain increasing independence from the
285. Lotzer, supra note 29, at 477 (stating that "[c]urrently, the interest of the child in
his own personal development receives the least emphasis, but this situation must change if
the legislature and the courts are to address homeschooling in a meaningful manner").
286. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (recognizing that "a student's legitimate
entitlement to a public education [is] a property interest which is protected by the Due
Process Clause and which may not be taken away.., without adherence to the minimum
procedures required by that Clause").
287. MAYBERRY E-T AL., supra note 3, at 77.
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state.28  However, after years in the courtrooms of America seeking
independence from public schools, home educators may soon be back
in the court seeking admission to those schools on their own terms.
Now that home schools are recognized as an independent and
legitimate educational alternative,289 home schools and public schools
should be viewed as equals in the debate concerning the possible inte-
gration of home and public schools. Home schools have rights that
must be respected,2 9 0 but the states also have interests that deserve
consideration. 9' Under the "compelling interest" test, these compet-
ing forces must be weighed against one another.2 92 In addition, when
considering whether children may be denied part-time access to public
school, the rights of those children must be thrown into the balance as
well.
2 93
Do public schools have a legal obligation to accommodate home-
schooled students who seek admission to one or two public school
courses per term? There are three possible answers to this dilemma:
(1) yes, public schools have a legal obligation to admit home-schooled
students;2 94 (2) no, public schools have a legal obligation to exclude
home-schooled students;295 or (3) public schools may use their discre-
tionary and regulatory authority to admit or deny home-schooled stu-
dents in accordance with the state's interests in educating children.296
As is often the case, the extreme positions, in which no flexibility ex-
288. Jack MacMullan, Comment, The Constitutionality of State Home Schooling Stat-
utes, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1309, 1349 (1994) (stating that "home schoolers have made signifi-
cant gains throughout the country over the last fifteen years"); see supra notes 266-76 and
accompanying text (describing the relaxation of home school regulation).
289. MacMullan, supra note 288, at 1337 (stating that "all of the states and the District
of Columbia now allow home schooling under certain conditions").
290. See supra notes 51-187 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of parents to
educate their children at home).
291. See supra notes 188-237 and accompanying text (discussing states' interests in gov-
erning the education of the children within their borders).
292. See supra notes 260-73 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
parents' rights and states' interests under the "compelling interest" test).
293. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of children to
education in public schools).
294. See infra notes 298-352 and accompanying text. Suggesting that public schools
have a duty to accept home-schooled students is the equivalent of suggesting that parents
and children have a right to enter public schools.
295. See infra notes 353-58 and accompanying text. Suggesting that public schools have
a duty to exclude home-schooled children seeking part-time admission is the equivalent of
suggesting that home-educating parents and home-schooled children have no right to enter
public schools on a part-time basis.
296. See infra notes 359-81 and accompanying text. It is important to note that permit-
ting public schools to use their discretionary and regulatory authority to admit or deny
part-time attendance by home-schooled children includes the caveat that if public schools
abuse that authority, parents may seek redress from courts.
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ists to recognize the equities of a specific situation, cannot provide
satisfactory solutions to the possibility of integrating home and public
education for some school-aged children. Instead, the third alterna-
tive, allowing public schools to use their discretionary authority to ad-
mit or deny home-schooled students on a part-time basis in a manner
that best satisfies the state's interest in educating children is the best
alternative. In considering the viability of each of these three alterna-
tives, this Comment will continue to consider the hypothetical intro-
duced at the outset of the Comment.297
Alternative One: Require Public Schools to Admit Home-Educated
Students on a Part-Time Basis
A requirement that public schools admit home-schooled students
may have some initial appeal because parents enjoy powerful rights to
direct their children's educations, and children possess a right to pub-
lic schooling once the state has acted to provide such schools. 298 How-
ever, after taking a closer look at these rights and their limitations in
conjunction with the states' interests in the education of children
within their borders, it is clear that public schools cannot be required
to admit home-educated students on a part-time basis.299
Home educators claim Fourteenth Amendment, First Amend-
ment, Fourth Amendment and Ninth Amendment protections of their
decision to home school their children. 00 In determining whether
home educators may legally require public schools to admit home-
schooled students on a part-time basis, only the First and Fourteenth
Amendment protections are relevant.30' The Fourteenth Amendment
297. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
298. Of course, this is the solution that home educators will desire. Home educators
want access to public resources "at their own discretion" (not at the discretion of public
school officials) and "without regulation." MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 77 (empha-
sis added).
299. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (holding that public schools may
(not must) release students for part-time religious instruction at a private school); Lanner
v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[plublic schools may permit
the release of students during school hours" (emphasis added)). Although both cases ad-
dressed the issue of whether public schools may release (not admit) an enrolled student to
a private (not home) school, they did consider part-time enrollment in public schools.
They did not conclude that public schools are required to allow part-time enrollment. Zo-
rach, 343 U.S. at 315; Lanner, 662 F.2d at 1359-60.
300. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
301. Although parents may theoretically rely on the Ninth Amendment for protection
of their decision to educate their child at home, in reality, courts have not recognized such
protection. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. In addition, the right to pri-
vacy claimed by home educators would not be an issue in determining whether public
schools have an obligation to admit home-schooled students on a part-time basis. Neither
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protects the parents' right "to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."3 2 Home educators, seeking admission
to public schools on their own terms, can claim that public schools
must be required to admit their children for one or two classes per day
because their decision to home educate would be burdened by any
other resolution to their perceived need for public assistance.30 3 This
argument begins with the premise that if home-schooled students
seeking admission, for example, to a public school chemistry course,3°
are not admitted to public school classes, then the home-educating
parents are burdened because they must attend college to prepare to
teach chemistry and buy laboratory equipment, continue to home ed-
ucate their child and deny the child an opportunity to study chemistry,
or forego home schooling entirely and send their child to public school
as a full-time student. The argument suggests that any regulation
placing the home educator in this position would burden her right to
direct and control the education of her children, and that public
schools are required to admit home-schooled children on a part-time
basis to avoid this unconstitutional burden. Although this argument
appears at first glance to have some merit, it cannot survive a more
thorough analysis.
A state need not admit home-schooled students on a part-time
basis to satisfy home educators' Fourteenth Amendment right to di-
rect the education of their children for three reasons. First, when a
public school does not provide a part-time enrollment policy for
home-schooled children, home-schooling parents are left with choices
regarding the child's education. 0 5 The parents, in essence, still may
the privacy of the decision to home school nor the privacy of the home school itself is being
invaded. In fact, the reverse is true. Instead of the state attempting to intrude into the
privacy of the home school, they want to keep out of it altogether. See supra notes 159-81
and accompanying text (discussing the right to privacy in the home school context).
302. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). The Fourteenth Amend-
ment also forbids laws or regulations that are impermissibly vague and that contain imper-
missible administrative discretion. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972). However, neither of these constitutional protections is relevant to a regulation that
would require public schools to admit home-schooled students on a part-time basis. An
absolute requirement is not vague, and it does not allow for any discretion.
303. See supra notes 55-123 and accompanying text (discussing parents' Fourteenth
Amendment right to direct the education of their children).
304. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (summarizing the hypothetical situa-
tion discussed throughout this Comment).
305. When a state regulation of home schooling does not prohibit home education, but
instead permits parents to choose to comply with specific regulations to facilitate the state's
interest in educating children, courts have been reluctant to find state regulations unconsti-
tutional. See, e.g., Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385-
86 (Me. 1988) (holding that a regulation permitting parents to choose home education as
long as they assured approval from the state did not violate either the Equal Protection or
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"direct the education of [their] children 3 °6 without a requirement
that public schools accept part-time students. A different situation
would arise if the state determined that if parents had not studied a
particular subject or did not have a particular kind of equipment, they
must relinquish control of their child's education to the state.30 7
Under that hypothetical situation, the parents' choices to prepare to
teach chemistry, to substitute an alternative course for chemistry and
continue teaching subjects in which they are familiar and in which
they possess all the requisite equipment are eliminated.30  A statute
requiring public schools to admit part-time students does not elimi-
nate those choices. Parents maintain control over how and where
their child receives her education. 0 9 Therefore, the parents' constitu-
tional right to direct their child's education would not be impermissi-
the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592,
599 (Mass. 1987) (finding that parents' right to control the education of their children was
not infringed upon by a state regulation that permitted parents to choose home education
with certain restrictions and recognizing that reasonable state regulations still allow par-
ents to choose to exercise their right to home educate their child); State v. DeLaBruere,
577 A.2d 254, 274 (Vt. 1990) (holding that a reasonable regulation permitting parents to
choose home education so long as they satisfied the state's interests by complying with
reporting requirements did not burden the parent's due process rights).
306. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
307. A regulation of this sort would parallel the teacher qualification statutes that re-
quired home educators to possess various degrees of certification before they could teach
their children at home. Just as "[tleacher certification requirements may prevent parents
who do not have the time or resources to pursue teaching credentials but are competent to
teach their children from exercising their constitutional rights," Henderson, supra note 87,
at 1006, forcing parents to study particular subjects or buy specific equipment might pre-
vent parents without the time to take courses or money to buy equipment from enjoying
their right to teach their children, even though they are competent teachers. These teacher
qualification statutes have been found unconstitutional. See supra note 270 and accompa-
nying text. Similarly, a requirement that parents relinquish control of their children's edu-
cation if they have not studied a particular course might be found unconstitutional.
308. When state regulations effectively eliminate home education as a choice for par-
ents, courts tend to find that they unconstitutionally burden parental rights. For example,
teacher certification requirements have been found unconstitutional because they "may
prevent parents ... from exercising their constitutional rights" to educate their children at
home. Henderson, supra note 87, at 1006; see, e.g., State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525,
532-33 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a requirement that home school teachers be "essentially
equivalent" to public school teachers was unconstitutionally vague).
309. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
when parents retain their right to choose where their children attend school, reasonable
regulation of teachers and pupils in all schools is constitutional); cf Evans v. Buchanan,
416 F. Supp. 328, 348 (D. Del. 1976) (recognizing the need to preserve parental control
over educational planning for children in the context of school desegregation and reason-
ing that a desegregation plan that eliminated parental control and political voice was defec-
tive), affid, 555 F.2d 373, 382 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
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bly burdened without a mandatory policy allowing part-time
attendance for home-schooled children in public schools. 310
In addition, even if one assumes that a home educator is uncon-
stitutionally burdened by a state's refusal to admit a home-schooled
child on a part-time basis, that burden is not caused by the absence of
a public school part-time attendance policy.311 Instead, when a home
educator seeks alternative sources of education for her child because
she does not possess the requisite training to teach or because she
does not have the requisite materials to teach, that home educator
cannot suggest that public schools have caused her to suffer a violation
of her constitutional rights.312 Instead, the home educator's lack of
education and lack of resources are the origin of the parent's di-
lemma. If the home educators were prepared to teach chemistry, then
there would be no problem in the home school.313 Only when the
home educators are not able to teach 314 does the question of integra-
tion with public schools arise.315
Another point provides additional support for the proposition
that parent educators have no constitutional claim necessitating a re-
quirement that public schools admit part-time students: Any denial of
310. Although parents enjoy a right to direct the education of their children, they do
not enjoy a constitutionally protected right to choose specific teachers to teach their chil-
dren specific subjects. Mount Sinai Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Board of Educ. Port Jefferson
Pub. Sch., 836 F. Supp. 95, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Therefore, parents who elect home edu-
cation for their children but also wish to choose a particular teacher in public schools for a
particular subject cannot claim constitutional protection for that choice.
311. In order to have constitutional standing in a federal court, a plaintiff must demon-
strate a "causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury
.... Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,753 n.19 (1984). A plaintiff's claim will be dismissed if
the plaintiff is without constitutional standing. Id. Therefore, if a home educator cannot
prove that the failure of public schools to permit part-time attendance caused a burden on
the home educator's rights, that individual will not have standing to bring an action to
challenge the constitutionality of the part-time policy.
312. Cf. Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373, 388
(Mich. 1986) (Boyle, J., concurring) (responding to a constitutional challenge to educa-
tional requirements for parochial school teachers and reasoning that the educational re-
quirements had not caused harm because home educators could satisfy those requirements
in a manner subject only to the home educators' choices and because they could be satis-
fied without violating fundamental religious beliefs), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
313. See Dorman, supra note 42, at 752-53 (recognizing that when home schools satisfy
teacher and curricular requirements no problem arises regarding the legitimacy of the
home school or the involvement of public school officials, but "if the home school ever falls
below required standards" then questions of state involvement arise).
314. Parents may be unprepared to teach either because they lack the education and
understanding necessary to teach a particular subject or because they lack the resources
necessary to teach a particular subject.
315. Similarly, in states with teacher qualification requirements, only when the "home
school [] falls below required standards" does the question of approval of the home school
arise. Dorman, supra note 42, at 752-53.
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part-time attendance does not prevent home educators from continu-
ing to exercise their right to control their children's' upbringing. The
home educators would still enjoy the full range of educational choices
for their children that are available to all parents of school-aged chil-
dren.316 They simply cannot demand a special choice not available to
other parents to send their child to public school on a part-time basis,
regardless of their motivation for desiring that choice.317
Essentially, permitting public schools to deny part-time admission
to students does not burden a home educator's fundamental right to
control the education of their child,318 does not cause any hardship for
home educators,3 19 and does not prevent home educators from en-
joying the same educational choice available to all parents of school-
aged children. 2 ° Therefore, a requirement that public schools admit
home-schooled students on a part-time basis is not necessary to satisfy
parents' Fourteenth Amendment rights. Parents, however, may alter-
natively claim that such a requirement is mandated by the First
Amendment, which also protects their choice to home educate their
children in some contexts.3 2'
The First Amendment argument in favor of requiring public
schools to establish a part-time attendance policy is quite similar to
the argument under the Fourteenth Amendment, and it suffers from
similar flaws. Home educators can claim that public schools must ac-
316. The absence of a part-time or dual enrollment policy between home and public
schools does not eliminate parents' choice to educate their children via home education,
see Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 402-03, 329 S.E.2d 636, 648 (1985) (finding that home
education is a means of satisfying compulsory school attendance statute), public education,
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-366(a) (1994) (conferring entitlement to public education on
all school-aged children domiciled within local school districts), or private education, see
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (finding that the right to attend private
school was within the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and prohibiting
states from requiring children to attend public schools only). In theory, each of these op-
tions is equally available to all parents. This author recognizes that in reality, access to
private education may be limited by financial or academic barriers, but a discussion of that
issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
317. In fact, students enrolled in a private school were enjoined from engaging in part-
time attendance in public schools in Parents' Ass'n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235,
1242 (2nd Cir. 1986). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
students enrolled in a private Jewish school who wanted to attend public school for reme-
dial classes on a part-time basis were not entitled to such a dual enrollment program be-
cause it would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 1241-42.
The program would have allowed private school students exclusive use of an entire wing in
a public school. Id at 1237.
318. See supra notes 51-187 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 302-15 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 124-58 and accompanying text (discussing the First Amendment's
relationship to home education).
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cept their children for part-time attendance in courses in which the
home school is not prepared to teach, because if the public schools
will not accept those children, then the home school choice (made in
compliance With a religious conviction or a personal ideology pro-
tected under the First Amendment) 3 - is effectively eliminated. This
occurs because parents must quit teaching their children at home to
attend classes to learn chemistry, the subject that their child wants to
study in the public schools. 323 Although this may be true,324 parents
cannot turn to the First Amendment to remedy their perceived
dilemma.' 5
If parents choose to educate their children at home because "God
commands them to educate their children"326 and the "worldly influ-
ences" 327 of the public schools would "substantially interfer[e] with
the religious development" 328 of the child, the First Amendment pro-
322. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
323. SeeLerner, supra note 261, at 382 (stating that teacher certification requirements
for home school teachers can "pose unusually strong and sometimes insurmountable obsta-
cles" to such parents and "can amount to a de facto prohibition of home schooling").
324. In reality, this should not be true. Parents may teach themselves any subject in the
evenings after home school classes are completed. They may order books and supplies
from which they might learn on their own without leaving the home school during the day
and without relinquishing educational control over their children. WHrrEHEAD & BIRD,
supra note 28 at 133-43 (providing the names and addresses of organizations through which
home educators may obtain educational materials). In addition, in many communities
courses are available at colleges in the evenings, and "there are religious institutions in
existence which ... teach... classes in a manner unobjectionable to ... religious beliefs."
Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373, 388 (Mich. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
325. See Lerner, supra note 261, at 382-86 (recognizing that although requiring home-
schooling parents to obtain certification through academic endeavors of their own may
place an insurmountable burden upon them, courts have upheld such requirements).
326. Michigan v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Mich. 1993).
327. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972).
328. Id. at 218. Of course, the argument may be espoused that chemistry, unlike a
course such as biology or possibly literature, does not directly offend the tenets of a partic-
ular religion, and therefore, that course (or a course such as algebra) does not violate the
religious mandate to educate children according to the commandments of the Bible. How-
ever, the worldly influence of the public schools is not limited to the subject matter of
particular courses. See generally SACHAR, supra note 242, at 11-14 (describing a math
classroom in a public school). The public school atmosphere itself is worldly, and even a
chemistry classroom may enjoy a "worldly" presence. Id. In most public school class-
rooms, individuals with different religions, backgrounds, races and beliefs share ideas with
one another. In addition, in any particular school, the biology teacher may also be the
chemistry teacher, and that teacher may bring examples and ideas from her biology class
into the chemistry classroom. Id. at 27 (noting that 10,000 teachers in New York's public
schools were assigned to teach outside their particular subject area). Therefore, the ideas
present in a course on chemistry may, in reality, offend the religious tenets of the home-
schooled student and her family.
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tects their decision to educate their children at home.32 9 To earn this
First Amendment protection, parents argue that their "religious con-
victions prohibit the use of certified [teachers]"'33 and that the "scrip-
ture is the complete and inherit [sic] word of God .... [and] to allow
the State to insert [sic] God's authority.., would be a sin."'331 Conse-
quently, when public schools require that their teachers acquire certi-
fication from the state,332 religious beliefs that "prohibit the use of
certified instructors '333 would prohibit enrollment in all public school
courses because all public school teachers would be certified. Public
school teachers would possess the prohibited certification regardless
of whether a student enrolled full-time or part-time in the public
schools. Therefore, parents cannot logically rely on the First Amend-
ment both to constitutionalize their right to keep their children out of
public schools and to compel public schools to allow their children
into the public schools on their own terms.
Although parents enjoy First and Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tections of their choice to educate their children at home,334 those pro-
tections do not extend to a desire by parents to elect an integrated
home and public educational program.335 Thus, these constitutional
329. See DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 144 (holding that home educators whose religious
convictions prohibit the use of certified teachers are protected by the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment from being required to obtain such certification).
330. Id.
331. It at 130 n.4.
332. "Every state currently has [a] certification program." Alisa Wabnick, Educators
Unwilling to Give up Teacher Certification, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Nov. 19, 1995, at 14A.; See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-3-16 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.010 (1995); ARiZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-532 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-12-20 (Michie 1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 44203 (West 1995); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-60-102 (West 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-144 (d) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.14, §122 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 231.15 (1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-298 (1995).
333. Deionge, 501 N.W.2d at 129.
334. See supra notes 51-187 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional pro-
tections enjoyed by parents who educate their children at home).
335. See supra notes 302-34 and accompanying text. In fact, if public schools established
a part-time enrollment policy for home-schooled students who attended a "religious" home
school, the policy could violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Porter, 485 F. Supp. 432, 444
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (holding that a dual enrollment program between public and parochial
schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). In Porter, the court
stated that "public aid to [religious] schools is sharply circumscribed by the absolute terms
of the First Amendment. Each attempt to aid a sectarian enterprise must be carefully
scrutinized to determine whether it constitutes a 'law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion.' " Id. at 433; see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397, 389
(1985) (holding that public school district's programs which created a partnership between
public schools and parochial schools were unconstitutional violations of the First Amend-
ment Establishment Clause and stating that "[g]overnment promotes religion as effectively
when it fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of any-
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amendments may not be relied upon by home educators in an effort to
require public schools to accept home-schooled students on a part-
time basis. Nevertheless, home educators may attempt to bring an
action on behalf of their children relying upon their children's right to
public education.336
Under the Due Process Clause, once a state has provided public
education, a state has conferred a benefit upon the children of that
state which cannot be taken away without due process of law.337
However, the due process right to public education contains inherent
or all-religious denominations as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious
doctrines").
336. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text (discussing children's rights to pub-
lic education).
337. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,574-75 (1975); see supra notes 238-49 and accompany-
ing text. State constitutions and state statutes may also provide children with an entitle-
ment to public education. However, even specific state provisions granting children a
"right" to public education do not require that public schools admit home-schooled stu-
dents on a part-time basis. Consider North Carolina law, for example. Although the
North Carolina Constitution provides that "[t]he people have a right to the privilege of
education," it does not provide an unlimited right to public education. See N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 15. The constitution only requires that "every child of appropriate age and of
sufficient mental and physical ability shall attend the public schools, unless educated by
other means." N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 3 (emphasis added). Essentially, public schools in
North Carolina are only obligated under the North Carolina Constitution to provide public
education for a child if that student is not "educated by other means." Id.
The state constitution presents a student and her parents with an educational choice.
The student may attend public school, or she may be educated by "other means." If a
student chooses home education, an "other means" of education, that student is no longer
automatically entitled to the privileges of public schools under the state constitution.
Therefore, as long as families intend to maintain their status as home school families, the
public schools should not be under any constitutional obligation to admit that child for one
or two classes per day because the child is being educated by "other means."
The North Carolina General Statutes also "entitle[ ] [students] to all the privileges and
advantages of the public schools .... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-366(a) (1994). However, it
is generally recognized that every statute is to be considered in light of the state constitu-
tion and to be interpreted consistently with the constitution's intent. Faulkner v. New
Bern-Craven Bd. of Educ., 311 N.C. 42, 58,316 S.E.2d 281,291 (1984); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-1 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (requiring that the public school opportunities pro-
vided under Chapter 115C are designed "in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of
the Constitution of North Carolina"). Under the state constitution and statute, the elec-
tion of public education and the election of education by other means seem to be mutually
exclusive options. In fact, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1994), a student must "at-
tend school continuously" wherever she chooses to attend. Id. Similarly, state courts have
supported the notion that once a family elects home education, public schools no longer
have an obligation to educate the home-schooled children and the children no longer may
claim a right to public education. See Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 402-03, 329 S.E.2d
636, 648 (1985) (holding that home schooling meets statutory requirements for compulsory
school attendance). A child who has elected home education no longer enjoys a "right" to
public school. Therefore, the public schools do not violate a child's "right" to public edu-
cation under state law if they do not admit a student who has elected home education.
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limits. In Goss v. Lopez,331 the case which established that children
enjoy this property right, the Court was concerned about a "total ex-
clusion from the educational process ... The students in that
case were suspended for ten days from the public schools in which
they received all of their education.340 During that time period, the
students were completely deprived of educational opportunity.34'
Unlike the students in Goss, home-schooled students seeking
part-time admission into a public school chemistry course are not "to-
tal[ly] exclu[ded] from the educational process '342 if they are denied
admission to that particular public school course. Instead, they con-
tinue to receive education at home. Therefore, the holding of Goss
does not extend to the circumstance in which home-schooled students
wish to integrate their education with public schooling. The Goss
holding is limited to situations in which children are denied their due
process "rights to an education" 343 by being completely denied any
educational opportunity. Since the holding of Goss does not apply to
children who seek one or two classes in public schools, home educa-
tors should not be able to rely on this constitutional precedent to ar-
gue that public schools must be required to admit their children on
their terms.'
Neither the parents345 nor the children 346 in home-educating fam-
ilies can claim that their constitutional rights require public schools to
admit home-schooled children on a part-time basis. However, even if
home educators could make such constitutional claims, the states' in-
terests in education should override those claims. 347 A requirement
338. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
339. d at 576.
340. 1d at 568.
341. 1d
342. IA at 576.
343. d at 569.
344. In addition to the fact that the Goss holding does not extend to situations in which
a total exclusion of education is not at stake, it may be argued that children waive their
right to public schools when they elect home education. In fact, some states have provided
by statute that once a family elects home education, no other educational provisions, in-
cluding those that provide "rights" to public education, shall apply to the home-schooled
family. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-565 (1994) (providing that no school under the
home school statutes "shall be subject to any other provision of law relating to education
except requirements of law respecting immunization").
345. See supra notes 302-35 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional claims
that home educators may attempt to use to assure the availability of a part-time enrollment
policy for their children).
346. See supra notes 336-44 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of a child's
right to public education on a part-time attendance plan).
347. When home educators claim constitutional protection for a decision bearing upon
their choice to home school their child, any regulation that "burdens" that decision may be
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that public schools admit any student on a part-time basis for one or
two classes per day creates numerous practical and administrative
problems for the public school.348 Consider, for example, the situa-
tion above in which a student who attends a religious home school
seeks admission to a single chemistry class at a public school. The
public school offers chemistry during fourth period because the chem-
istry teacher teaches other courses during other periods and because
offering chemistry during fourth period enables all of the full-time stu-
dents who desire a chemistry course to enroll. However, the home-
schooled student typically studies religion for religious reasons during
that time. Must the public school either rearrange the schedule
(preventing some of the full-time students from taking chemistry) or
hire a new teacher to teach chemistry during a time in which the
home-schooled student does not study religion? If the public school is
required to admit home-schooled students on a part-time basis in ac-
cordance with the needs of that student, the public schools could be
required to deprive full-time students of the accomplishment of their
educational goals. Further, public schools could be required to use
their limited resources inefficiently, spending money against the inter-
ests of the public school population at large and disserving the states'
interests in assuring that all of its children receive the best education
the schools may provide.
349
If public schools were required to admit home-schooled students
on a part-time basis, they would be required to spend their limited
funds inefficiently at the expense of their full-time students in a
subject to the "compelling interest" test. See supra notes 261-76 and accompanying text.
Under that test, a regulation may override the constitutional challenge if the state demon-
strates that the regulation serves a "compelling interest" and the regulation is the least
burdensome means to satisfy that interest. See supra notes 261-76 and accompanying text;
see also Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 1443, 1451
(M.D.N.C. 1995) (recognizing that although parents have a right to direct the education of
their child, " '[a] way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular consider-
ations' " (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))).
States' interests in the education of children, see supra notes 219-26, might even justify a
requirement that home schoolers attend public school part-time for a course on govern-
mental affairs. See Easterly, supra note 88, at 102 (noting that "it would not be unreasona-
ble to require under statute that all students complete a publicly sponsored course to
discuss the organization of government and citizen participation in the political process").
348. Without this added complication, public schools already suffer from numerous ad-
ministrative burdens. See generally SACHAR, supra note 242, at 25-59 (describing daily
administrative and practical realities in a public school).
349. A requirement that public schools spend money to satisfy the part-time attendance
needs of home-schooled students (for whom the public schools do not receive funding)
provides a specific educational advantage to home-schooled students at the expense of the
general school-aged population attending public schools in the state.
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number of circumstances. If a home-schooled child attends chemistry
for one period in the public schools, someone must pick up the child
from public school after that course is over. What is the public
school's responsibility to the home-schooled child if, after the class
period has ended, the child's parents do not arrive to pick her up and
return her to her home school classes? The public school cannot send
the home-schooled child to a literature course, for example, with the
other students in the class, because that class may contain material
that is incompatible with the religious convictions of the home-school-
ing family. The public school cannot leave the child unattended be-
cause that leaves an opportunity for the child to disrupt the entire
educational process in the school. Essentially, the public school would
have to establish a child-care service for home-schooled children who
arrive early for their class or who stay late after their class. The cost
of hiring such a supervisor would come at the expense of the public
school students at large, and it would be a benefit provided exclusively
for home-schooled students.
Similarly, if the home-schooled student sought admission to a
chemistry course in which the public school had already enrolled the
maximum number of students permitted under federal and state laws,
the public school would have to hire a teacher's aide to accommodate
the home-schooled student's desire. Again, the cost of hiring this new
employee solely for the benefit of the home student would come at
the expense of the public school population at large.
In addition to the practical and financial burdens placed upon the
public schools if they are required to admit home-schooled students
into courses at the public schools, the opportunity for individuals to
exploit the public schools under these circumstances is readily appar-
ent.350 If the public school must admit home-schooled students seek-
ing part-time enrollment, then a home educator could, for example,
bring her child to the public schools for a gym class simply to get a
"break" from her children during the afternoon. Essentially, the pub-
lic schools would have to admit children in and out of their classrooms
throughout the day for any reason.35' In fact, if parents wanted to
sleep late in the mornings, they could use the public schools part-time
350. This author does not wish to imply that members of the home education commu-
nity are prone to exploit an opportunity to attend public school on a part-time basis. How-
ever, a rule requiring admission of part-time students in public schools could attract a new,
non-traditional kind of home educator seeking to "take advantage" of the part-time rule.
351. In addition to the financial problems in such a situation, public schools would have
difficulty enforcing an attendance policy because they could not simply check attendance
for each class period to assure that all the children were present in each class. Instead, they
would have to monitor each child individually under his or her particular schedule.
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in the afternoons and home school their children in the evenings, sim-
ply to avoid waking up in time for morning classes. If a student did
not like her math teacher, the family could decide to use the public
schools part-time for all classes except math, teaching the child at
home during math period. Under these circumstances, no state inter-
est in education is served by permitting part-time enrollment because
the children are not satisfying educational goals through their educa-
tional choices;35 z however, the financial and administrative burdens
inherent in a part-time enrollment structure would still threaten the
school.
Alternative Two: Require Public Schools to Deny Admission to
Students Seeking Part-Time Attendance
Just as no constitutional authority or state interest supports a pol-
icy requiring that public schools admit home-schooled students on a
part-time basis, no authority or interest supports a policy requiring
public schools to exclude all students who seek part-time admission.
Although there is no constitutional barrier to denying part-time ad-
mission in every case, the states' interest in assuring that all school-
aged children within their borders receive an effective education 5 3
should prevent states from instituting a blanket denial of all home-
schooled students seeking part-time admission to the public schools.
Under some circumstances, the educational interests of the states
are best served by permitting a home-educated student to attend a
class in the public schools. If a home-schooled student lives within
walking distance of the school and plans to attend a college following
completion of her home school curriculum, and if the public school
has empty space in chemistry (the course desired by the home-
schooled student) at the time desired by the student, the states' inter-
ests are best served by admitting that student. Since the student lives
within walking distance of the school, there would be no problem with
supervision of the child after her chemistry course was over. The child
could walk home as soon as class ended. Additionally, the school
would not need to fund a teacher's aide because the child would not
fill the class beyond the student enrollment limitations imposed upon
public schools. Further, because the student is willing to attend the
class in the period planned for the course, the public school would not
352. See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text (identifying the states' interests in
education).
353. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (identifying states' interests in
preparing children effectively for participation in our political system and for making self-
sufficient life choices as adults).
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be burdened with adding a new chemistry class or re-scheduling the
original course. Finally, since the home-schooled student is seeking
admission to the public schools for academic reasons, the public
schools are not being exploited by the child's attendance in that
school. The student, using the education provided at the public
schools, should have a better opportunity to succeed in college and
become a productive member of the community.354
Thus, under certain circumstances, the states' interests in assuring
that their citizens are properly educated to become self-sufficient, con-
tributing members of the communities of the state3 55 are best served
by allowing home-schooled students admission into the public schools
on a part-time basis. This is particularly true when the full-time public
school students will not bear the burden of lost expenditures devoted
exclusively to particular home-schooled individuals.
In circumstances in which no students suffer a loss of opportunity
or a loss of revenue, but all students receive enhanced educational
experience, the states' interests are best served by permitting part-
time enrollment.35 6 Under these circumstances, "involving home-edu-
cating parents and their children in conventional school programs will
enhance both the performance of home-educated children and the ac-
ademic and social environment of conventional schools. 3 57 There-
fore, any policy obligating public schools to deny all home-schooled
students seeking part-time admission would contravene the states' in-
terests in providing the optimum education for its school-aged
children. 5 8
354. If the student is seeking admission into a course such as algebra, that course may
be determinative of whether the child can gain admission into college. The Scholastic Ap-
titude Test used by most colleges to determine admission of students includes material
covered in algebra. If the child does not have an opportunity to study algebra, the child
may not be able to attend college because the child may not be able to complete problems
on the entrance exam. See MITCHEL WEINER & SHARON WEINER GREEN, How To PRE-
PARE FOR THE SAT 1243 (18th ed. 1994) (noting that the math section of the SAT requires
knowledge of algebra).
355. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
356. See supra notes 188-237 (discussing states' interests in regulating education).
357. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 80.
358. See infra notes 368-81 and accompanying text (discussing examples of home and




Alternative Three: Permit Educational Officials to Use Their
Regulatory and Discretionary Authority to Admit or Deny Part-Time
Enrollment of Home-Educated Students on a Case-by Case Basis
When asked the general question whether public schools should
have an obligation to accommodate home-schooled students who seek
part-time admission into public schools, the answer should be neither
yes nor no. An extreme or absolute response to the proposed integra-
tion of public and home education does not permit an examination of
the equities and interests involved in a particular case. Extreme posi-
tions fail to recognize that some situations exist in which public
schools should admit home-schooled students on a part-time basis and
that some situations exist in which public schools should not admit
such students. States should recognize that their public school offi-
cials possess both regulatory and discretionary authority to admit or
deny a request for part-time attendance in conjunction with the state's
interests.
359
Although no constitutional barrier prevents public schools from
implementing a policy in which all part-time enrollment applications
are denied or in which all part-time enrollment applications are ac-
cepted,360 home educators may attempt to challenge a policy in which
public school officials have discretion to accept or deny their part-time
enrollment application under the Fourteenth Amendment.361 The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that deci-
sions which affect fundamental rights be made by a neutral decision-
maker?6 Consequently, parents may claim that if public school offi-
359. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-40 (1994) ("Local boards of education ... shall
have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their
administrative units."). Courts have recognized the discretionary authority of local boards
of education in other contexts. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (holding
that public schools may release students for part-time religious instruction at a private
school); Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[p]ublic
schools may permit the release of students during school hours" (emphasis added)).
Although both Zorach and Lanner addressed the issue of whether public schools may re-
lease (not admit) a student to a private (not home) school, they did consider part-time
enrollment in public schools. However, they did not conclude that public schools "may"
release students at their discretion. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315; Lanner, 662 F.2d at 1359-60.
360. See supra notes 298-358 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which
home educators may claim a right to a neutral and detached decision-maker as well as
situations in which the bias of public school officials bears upon educational decision-
making).
362. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (examining the role of the neutral
decision-maker as it bears upon a defendant's right to a fair trial); Jessen v. Village of
Lyndon Station, 519 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (recognizing the requirement of
a neutral and detached decision-maker to protect rights to due process).
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cials determine whether a home-schooled student should be permitted
to enroll part-time in public schools, the officials have violated their
Fourteenth Amendment right to a "neutral and detached judge." 363
However, such a claim by home educators would be ill-founded. The
Fourteenth Amendment only requires a neutral decision-maker in de-
cisions bearing upon an individual's life, liberty, or property interests
protected by the Due Process Clause.364 As discussed above, the deci-
sion regarding admission or denial of a home-schooled student into
public schools does not threaten a fundamental right of either the
home educators or their children. 65 The "rights" enjoyed by parents
when they are attempting to withhold their children from public
schools do not extend to the inverse situation in which parents are
attempting to return their children to public schools on their own
terms. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment right to a neutral and
detached judge for decisions affecting fundamental rights does not ap-
ply to this situation.3 66 Consequently, the Constitution permits a pol-
icy in which public school officials use their discretionary authority to
363. Ward, 409 U.S. at 62.
364. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any state deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law"); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332
(1976) ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which de-
prive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment."). Furthermore, even if a Fourteenth
Amendment life, liberty, or property interest is implicated, a "neutral and detached judge"
may not always be required. Id. at 335. The constitutionality of procedural safeguards
afforded to any official government decision requires a balancing of three distinct factors:
[flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.
Id. This balancing test has been used to uphold a statute under which the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare could serve as the decision-maker in a hearing on whether
to terminate an individual's disability benefits, even though the Secretary himself was a
party to the hearing. Id. at 327, 349.
365. See supra notes 298-358 and accompanying text.
366. Public school board discretionary authority over home schools has been upheld in
a number of other contexts. See, eg., State v. Brewer, 444 N.W.2d 923, 926 (N.D. 1989)
(holding that a statute granting school boards power to determine whether students are
entitled to exemptions from compulsory school attendance did not violate the Due Process
Clause); State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316, 320 (N.D.) (holding that a statute granting
school boards power to monitor attendance of home school children did not violate the
Due Process Clause), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 965-66 (1988); In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592,
597-98 (Mass. 1987) (holding that a statute delegating power to approve home schools to
school boards was constitutional).
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admit or deny part-time enrollment of home-schooled students on a
case-by-case basis.367
In recent years, in a few localities in California, public and home
schools have begun a slow movement toward cooperation in recogni-
tion of the desire of both parties to maximize educational opportuni-
ties for children.368 In these locations, public officials have maintained
control and discretion over the initial stages of the integration of
home and public education.36 9 For example, in several California
county departments of public education, local officials have "insti-
tuted independent study programs [to] enroll home-educated children
in public schools. ' 370 Under such programs, "[t]he home education
families receive services such as consulting assistance from state-em-
ployed teachers, newsletters, ideas for field trips, and some instruc-
tional materials. In turn, public schools receive 'average daily
367. In fact, most courts "constru[e] the school board's function as ministerial rather
than discretionary, [label] the superintendent's decision-making authority as 'not unbri-
dled,' or find[ ] that the probability of actual bias on the part of school officials is not high
enough to be unconstitutionally intolerable." MacMullan, supra note 288, at 1333. Since
the school board serves a ministerial function, they may use their authority to make deci-
sions regarding home education without violating the constitutional requirement of a neu-
tral and detached decision-maker for decisions bearing upon fundamental rights.
Anderson, 427 N.W.2d at 320.
368. In other states, where no statute or regulation mandates that public school officials
maintain discretionary control over part-time enrollment of home-schooled children, state
lav suggests that such a policy should be the rule. Consider North Carolina, for example.
Recognizing that public schools are not required under either the state constitution or the
state statutes to accept home-schooled students on a part-time basis does not mean that
public schools are prohibited from accepting those home-schooled students in particular
circumstances. See supra note 337. No North Carolina statute directly defines guidelines
to govern the possibility of part-time admission of home-schooled students into public
school classes. However, according to North Carolina General Statute § 115C-40, "[iocal
boards of education ... shall have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining
to the public schools in their administrative units." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-40 (1994).
Therefore, "[i]n the absence of any statute or regulation to the contrary, the authority to
determine questions regarding the public schools generally rests with local boards of edu-
cation." 57 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 26 (1987) (stating that it is within the discretionary power
of local boards of education to release public school students for part-time attendance at
private (not home) schools). Given the absence of other statutory direction, § 115C-40
gives local boards in North Carolina discretion to accept or deny part-time admission to
home-schooled students. This conclusion regarding home and public school integration in
North Carolina is consistent with the state's opinion regarding the integration of public and
private schools, The North Carolina Attorney General determined that the authority of
the local board of education included "the power to permit or refuse the release of stu-
dents to private schools for part of the school day." 57 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. at 26.
369. Although this author is only aware of a few instances in which home-schooled
students are officially permitted to enroll in classes in public schools, these instances should
serve as an example for other localities.
370. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 81.
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attendance' money for each student" who participates in the in-
dependent study program and enrolls in class in public school.371
This independent study program avoids the pitfalls of a
mandatory admission policy in which public schools are forced to in-
cur financial loss to accommodate the various desires of home-educat-
ing families by permitting states to enroll students only when they
receive sufficient funding to accommodate the home-schooled student
without cost to the other students in the school. Similarly, it avoids
the dangers of a policy excluding all part-time applicants because stu-
dents who are seeking necessary and beneficial educational resources
are able to receive them if certain requirements are satisfied. Finally,
this policy does not deprive public school students of the opportunity
for enhanced diversity in the classroom, nor does it deprive home-
schooled students of their desired educational opportunity. By al-
lowing the public school officials to regulate the integration of home
and public education, the needs of the children and of the state are
efficiently served under this independent study program.372
In San Diego, home school educators and public school district
officials established a more extensive home and public school integra-
tion program after year-long negotiations.373 This program, called the
Community Home Education (CHE) program, "is explicitly designed
to benefit both home-educating parents and public schools. ' 374 Under
CHE, home schools receive public services and resources, and the
"public schools receive extra funding per student and the commitment
of the home education parents who use public services. '375 However,
the public officials retain control over the program and establish their
own requirements for participation.3 76 Home educators must comply
with the regulations of the public officials in order to participate:
The San Diego School District notifies parents who are con-
sidering home educating their children about the CHE pro-
gram and advises them of the district's expectations for
parents who enroll. Once in the program, the district pro-
vides parents with a complete set of textbooks for each child,
as well as in-service activities and curriculum guides for their
own use. These materials are to be used as the home
school's core curriculum, but parents may supplement them
371. Id.
372. Id. at 80.
373. Iat at 82.
374. Itd
375. IM.
376. Id. at 82-83 (noting that home educators may only participate in the program if
they satisfy the curricular demands of the public school administration).
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with any other materials they wish. Parents are asked to pre-
pare weekly lesson plans and submit copies to the program
coordinator each month, along with samples of their chil-
dren's work. In addition, the CHE program offers weekly
hands-on science experiences for home-educated students;
operates a computer laboratory staffed with a full-time
teacher and teacher's aide; organizes frequent field trips for
home-educating families; conducts networking meetings for
parents ... meets with individual parents three times a year
to evaluate the progress of the home school program... and
provides books and audiovisual materials to parent
educators.377
By working with home educators, while recognizing their indepen-
dence from public schools, public school officials are able to assure
that the interests of the state are served in both the home and public
school environments.378
Advocates of home education have lauded the independent study
program found in some California districts and the Community Home
Education program in San Diego despite the fact that public school
officials have maintained regulatory and discretionary control over
certain aspects of home schooling under those programs. 379 Home ed-
ucators appear willing to "give in" to state regulations in return for
educational resources from public schools, and public school officials
appear willing to accommodate the needs of home-schooled students
in return for assurance that home school curriculums satisfy state
standards.38 o
Although neither program focuses solely upon the admission of
home-schooled students on a part-time basis, they demonstrate that
public school officials are capable of cooperation with home educators
and that public school officials can, under specified guidelines, exer-
cise their discretionary authority to the benefit of both public school
students and home-schooled students. These programs "remind us of
the often-overlooked fact that parent educators and educational pro-
377. Id.
378. Some legislatures, although neglecting to provide statutory regulation for integra-
tion of home and public school students in public classrooms, have provided for the inte-
gration of home and public students in interscholastic athletics. Naturally, under the
state's regulations, the home-schooled students must satisfy the state provisions before
they may participate in the state's athletic programs. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 339.460
(1995) (providing home-schooled students with an "opportunity to participate in all inter-
scholastic activities if the student fulfills" specified conditions).
379. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 80-83.
380. See id at 82 (discussing a cooperative education in which home educators give up
some educational control in exchange for public schools providing them with curricular
support).
1996] 1975
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fessionals do successfully cooperate.... [and that they can] find[ ] a
balance between the individualistic stance of many home-educating
parents and the state's interest in educational matters.
38 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, the home education movement has
boomed.38 z Increasing numbers of families are selecting home educa-
tion for their children.383 As more and more American children are
educated in homes instead of public or private schools, home schools
will become increasingly prominent in the educational scene in this
country.384 Although home educators may recall their recent history
of struggle against public school officials, home schooling has clearly
become an independent and legitimate educational choice, standing
on equal ground with public and private schools. 38 5 However, now
that home schools have established themselves as independent institu-
tions protected in varying degrees by several constitutional provisions,
some home-schooling families are preparing to confront the public
schools in a new academic battle in which home schools and public
schools face one another as equals. Many home educators would like
the opportunity to enroll their children part-time in public schools,
386
and the public schools are resisting that possibility.
387
Although public schools are under no legal obligation to admit
home-schooled students,388 it is not in the best interest of the schools
or the children to deny all requests for part-time admission by such
students.389 Instead, the ideal educational result may be reached if
public school officials consider each application, on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and admit only those home-schooled students seeking a genuine
educational opportunity in the public schools who can enter public
school classes without disadvantaging full-time public school stu-
381. Id at 83.
382. Adams, supra note 3, at 30 (observing that there has been a dramatic increase in
the number of children home schooled in the past decade and estimating that the increase
has been tenfold).
383. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 7 (tracking the growth of home-based instruc-
tion from the 1980s, when 60,000 to 125,000 children were in home schools, to 1994, when
450,000 to 800,000 children were educated at home).
384. Manning, supra note 8, at 01D (explaining that the home education movement is a
"trend" that will carry our nation into the twentieth century).
385. KL[CKA, supra note 3, at 155.
386. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 71.
387. Proctor, supra note 14, at 1326 (observing that most educators would prefer to
prohibit home education entirely).
388. See supra notes 298-352 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 353-58 and accompanying text.
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dents.390 Essentially, when faced with the question of whether to ad-
mit a home-schooled student on a part-time basis, as long as school
officials exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with the
states' interests in providing the, best possible education for all of its
school-age children, both home-schooled students and public-
schooled students may benefit from the integrated environment that
results. In a sense, both home schools and public schools may "win"
in the latest battle between the two educational systems.39'
LISA M. LUKASIK
390. See supra notes 359-81 and accompanying text.
391. MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 81-83 (recognizing that there are several ways
in which public schools and home schools could serve each other advantageously).
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